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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article stems from my presentation at a Symposium hosted
by Rutgers School of Law-Newark in March 2013, where I asserted
that private industry’s ability to surreptitiously gather, collect, store,
and sell vast amounts of intimate, personal data constitutes a far
more insidious threat to privacy than that posed by government
electronic snooping, because government is bound by the constraints
of the Fourth Amendment1 and the federal wiretapping and
electronic surveillance legislative scheme. I asserted that our
constitutional concept of individual privacy and the protection we
afford to the same will be eviscerated by the activities of private
industry lest Congress act to protect individual privacy and an
individual’s power to control the data gathered, collected, stored, and
sold by private industry in ways similar to the protections afforded
individuals from such government activity by constitutional,
legislative, and common law.
But headline events impacted my premise.
In June 2013, Edward Snowden’s leaks about the National
Security Agency’s (NSA) wholesale Internet and cellular surveillance
of all United States citizens’ electronic activities—including, but not
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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limited to, Internet activity and constant geolocation data—and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s (FISC or FISA court) secret
judicial support of such techniques changed the game. 2 While some
privacy advocates and U.S. Senators had warned of such invasive
government surveillance,3 Snowden’s leaks crystallized its scale.
After weeks spent reading every internecine development in the
story and updating research, the conclusion: Yes, the revelations
required rewriting sections of this Article, but, in short, the new
information strongly bolstered the grounds for this proposal.
Technological advances have turned our privacy jurisprudence
on end. Applying the traditional reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis and the third-party doctrine to advanced technologies and
Internet-based activity requires courts to engage in absurd legal
acrobatics4 to preserve any sense of privacy.
The proposal: (1) We legislatively define what individual privacy
is; (2) we do so independent of technology-specific language; (3) we
restrict and legislatively regulate private industry and government
surveillance, collection, storage, use, and distribution of data in the
same or parallel ways; and (4) we legislatively provide individuals
with the right to know and/or control (a) what data is collected about
them, (b) who is collecting such data, (c) what data is retained, and
(d) how such data is used.
As explained below, private industry tracks 24/7 our physical
location, online travels, friends, activities, likes and dislikes,
preferences (including religious and sexual), personal status
(married, divorced, or single), and financial status.5 Such tracking is
accomplished in myriad ways and, more increasingly, it is done using
individuals’ biometric identifiers.6 In the process of this tracking,
private industry collects, stores, and sells an astonishing amount of
personal data.7 The Supreme Court is uncomfortable with twenty-

2. See Alexis C. Madrigal, NSA Leak Catch-Up: The Latest on the Edward
Snowden
Fallout,
THE
ATLANTIC
(June
17,
2013,
3:51
PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/06/nsa-leak-catch-up-the-lateston-the-edward-snowden-fallout/276926/.
3. Brian Knowlton, Lawmakers Mostly Defend Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2013, at A12.
4. As Justice Alito so famously stated in pointing out the problems of applying
traditional privacy concepts to modern technologies: “The Court suggests that
something like this might have occurred in 1791, but this would have required either a
gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
958 n.3 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
5. See infra Part IV.A-B.
6. See infra Part III.C.
7. See Daniel Zwerdling, Your Digital Trail: Private Company Access, NPR.ORG
(Oct.
1,
2013,
2:00
PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/10/01/227776072/your-digital-trailprivate-company-access.
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eight days of 24/7 warrantless GPS tracking, 8 but nothing stops
private industry from engaging in the same. 9 Snowden’s NSA
surveillance revelations and publication of secret FISA court orders
irrefutably demonstrate that private industry’s vast databases are
open season for government investigators. 10
This Article first summarizes our privacy law framework; it next
discusses technological advances that permit invasive data gathering
and how private industry uses these advances to track us; then it
considers the problems posed by application of traditional privacy
jurisprudence concepts to advanced technologies; and, lastly, this
Article proposes a legislative solution.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF PRIVACY LAW: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Constitution
1. The Right to Privacy Concept
The word “privacy” does not appear in the United States
Constitution.11 In the seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The
Right to Privacy, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis framed our
modern constitutional and common law concepts of privacy.12 Thanks
in part to Warren and Brandeis’s article, our Constitution—despite
missing the magic privacy word—is the cornerstone of modern
privacy law.13
There are some marked similarities between today’s societal and
legal privacy struggles and those of the 1890s. At the time Warren
and Brandeis’s article was published, American society was facing
aggressive, sensationalistic press; 14 there was incredible growth in
newspaper circulation rates,15 which fueled the financial rewards

8. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
9. See, e.g., Fact Sheet 18: Online Privacy: Using the Internet Safely, PRIVACY
RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/content/online-privacy-usinginternet-safely (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
10. See Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User
Does on the Internet’, THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013, 8:56 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data.
11. See U.S. CONST.; see also Mark Silverstein, Note, Privacy Rights in State
Constitutions: Models for Illinois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 218 (1989).
12. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
13. See generally id.
14. The term “Yellow Journalism” was coined to describe private press activities of
the time. JOSEPH W. CAMPBELL, YELLOW JOURNALISM: PUNCTURING THE MYTHS,
DEFINING THE LEGACIES 33 (2001).
15. James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 889-90
(1979).
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reaped from more invasive, intrusive newsgathering activities; 16 and
technological developments flourished, including readily available
and affordable photography devices17 and recording devices,18 both of
which permitted individuals to be recorded and photographed at an
unprecedented rate.19 These factors—(1) legally unfettered gathering
of personal data (2) by private industry for commercial gain (3)
enabled through advanced technologies—combined to foster
invasions of individual privacy on a scale heretofore unimaginable.20
When boiled down to the aforementioned factors, which spurred
Warren and Brandeis to write their article and advocate for a new
legal right, connecting the dots further is unnecessary: The similarity
of the privacy problems today and those in 1890 is strikingly similar.
In their introduction to The Right to Privacy, Warren and
Brandeis overview the Anglo-American jurisprudence system that
enables our law’s developmental flexibility to keep abreast of social,
political, and technological changes.21 The authors then highlight
how—enabled by developments in technology—the sacred precincts
of private and domestic life were being invaded in ways not
previously possible.22 Warren and Brandeis ask whether existing
laws in 1890 were capable of protecting the privacy of the
individual.23 After an analysis of available legal remedies,24 the two
conclude that, while some laws may hinder certain types of privacy
invasion (e.g., libel and slander), existing laws were too limited in
stopping unwanted personal data gathering by private industry.25
Warren and Brandeis contend that there is a general right to privacy
that, if properly understood, affords a remedy for the insidious,
intrusive invasions of the right.26
By providing the factual stage and describing in detail the
nature of injury caused by privacy invasions, Warren and Brandeis
unequivocally demonstrate the societal need for a new right. 27 The
two then persuasively explain how the right to privacy is both
16. See id. at 891.
17. This era saw the mass market introduction of Kodak’s small snap camera.
History
of
Kodak
Milestones
1879-1929,
KODAK,
http://www.kodak.com/country/US/en/corp/kodakHistory/1878_1929.shtml (last visited
Nov. 3, 2013).
18. See DAVID R. SPENCER, THE YELLOW JOURNALISM: THE PRESS AND AMERICA’S
EMERGENCE AS A WORLD POWER 54 (David Abrahamson, ed., 2007).
19. See, e.g., id. at 2-3.
20. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 15, at 889-91.
21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 193-95.
22. See id. at 195.
23. See id. at 197.
24. See id. at 197-207.
25. See id. at 207.
26. See id. at 198.
27. See id. at 197-98.
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derived from and present throughout our common law and historical
concepts of “an inviolate personality” and “the right to be let alone.” 28
Pointing to privacy protections afforded by tort law, evidence,
property rights, contract law, and criminal law, the two establish
that the right to privacy is not a new concept, but something carried
throughout all of these sources of common law, constitutional law,
and statutory law.29 Warren and Brandeis frame what the scope of
the right to privacy is, outline the remedies it should afford, and
reject criticisms of the recognition of the right to privacy they
foresee.30 As we know, Warren and Brandeis’s proposed common-law
right to privacy was ultimately recognized and adopted by the United
States Supreme Court and by state courts and state legislatures
across the nation.31
2. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.32

The Fourth Amendment applies only to government search and
seizure.33 It does not apply to private industry or third-party search
and seizure.34 While the Fourth Amendment provides no enforcement
or privacy protections against private industry’s collection and use of
personal data, it may provide a guiding framework for restricting and
regulating private industry’s personal data collection and use. Due to
space constraints, this Article must assume readers are generally
aware of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and
the Court’s development of the reasonable expectation of privacy test
and the third-party doctrine.35 This Article considers the Court’s
28. Id. at 193, 197-205.
29. See id. at 197-214.
30. See id. at 214-20.
31. See generally Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to
Privacy and the Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623 (2002) (examining
the legal impact and legacy of The Right to Privacy); Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of
the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to
Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479 (1990) (tracing the development of
privacy rights from The Right to Privacy).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
34. See id.
35. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60
STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007) (discussing reasonable expectation of privacy test); Stephen
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more recent, technology-specific Fourth Amendment cases to
illustrate the vexing application of the Fourth Amendment, the
reasonable expectation of privacy test, and the third-party doctrine to
emerging surveillance technology and existing digital data collection
practices and geolocation tracking.
B. The Federal Legislative Scheme 36
In 1968, in response to considerable social and political activity
on a variety of fronts, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act.37 Title III of that Act regulates interception of
communications by public officials and private persons. 38 In general
terms, the electronic surveillance statutory scheme developed by
Congress is collectively referred to as Title III.
Congress enacted Title III with two primary goals in mind. First,
it sought to safeguard the privacy of wire and oral
communications39—electronic communications were added to the
statute’s coverage in 198640—and, in particular, the privacy of
innocent persons.41 Thus, Title III forbids the interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications by private persons unless the
communication is intercepted by, or with the consent of, a
participant, and significantly restricts the authority of law
enforcement officials to intercept such communications. 42 Second,
Title III sought to provide law enforcement officials with a muchneeded weapon in their fight against crime, particularly organized
crime,43 by empowering them to intercept such communications
E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011) (discussing third-party doctrine).
36. Portions of this discussion have been excerpted from 1 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN &
ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING: SURVEILLANCE IN THE
INTERNET AGE (3d ed. 2012), which provides a much more extensive discussion of the
federal electronic surveillance legislative scheme.
37. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §
801(b), 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522
(2012)).
38. Id.
39. § 801(b), 82 Stat. at 211; S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 37, 60 (1968), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153, 2177; see also State v. Gilmore, 549 N.W.2d 401, 405
(1996) (“[T]he Senate Report accompanying Title III underscored that ‘protecting the
privacy of wire and oral communications’ was a chief congressional concern in enacting
the law.”); FISHMAN & MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING, supra note 36, §
1.6, at 1-14.
40. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012)).
41. § 801(d), 82 Stat. at 211; S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 60.
42. Omnibus Crime Control of Sale Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §
2511(2)(c), 82 Stat. 197, 214 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522
(2012)).
43. § 801(c), 82 Stat. at 211; S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 40, 60.
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under carefully regulated circumstances. 44 With regard to the latter
goal, Congress endeavored to satisfy the procedural and substantive
requirements previously enunciated by the Supreme Court in Berger
v. New York45 and Katz v. United States46 as constitutional
prerequisites to a valid communication interception statute47 while
defining “on a uniform basis”—applicable to state as well as federal
government—“the circumstances . . . under which the interception of
wire and oral communications [and, subsequently, electronic
communications] may be authorized” by a judicially issued
interception order.48
Title III provides a detailed legislative scheme. It specifies who
may authorize an investigator to apply for a court order, the
information an application must contain, the findings a judge must
make before issuing the order, how the order is to be executed, how
recordings of intercepted conversations are to be secured, who must
eventually receive notice that a phone or other communications
facility was tapped or a location was bugged, among other details. 49
The statute describes when information obtained from intercepted
communications may be disclosed, identifies who may seek to
suppress evidence and on what grounds, and sets forth an
exclusionary rule.50 It also creates a civil cause of action for those
whose communications are unlawfully intercepted. 51 An in-depth
analysis of the federal electronic surveillance legislative scheme is
well beyond the scope of this Article. For our purposes, however,
there are components of this scheme that we must briefly consider.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)
amended Title III’s definition of “wire communication” to include
“electronic” communications.52 The broad definition of “electronic”
communications brings a host of modern, Internet-based
communications within the ECPA’s purview.53 In terms of tracking
devices, a method by which private industry surreptitiously and
44. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 40-46.
45. 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) (holding that conversations are protected by the Fourth
Amendment and that the capture of conversations using electronic devices constitutes
a search).
46. 389 U.S. 347, 353, 359 (1967) (enunciating that the Fourth Amendment
protects persons in addition to property and that Fourth Amendment protection
guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy).
47. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 44-46.
48. Id. at 37.
49. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211, 216-23 (1968).
50. Id. at 222-25.
51. Id. at 223.
52. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, §
101(a)(6), 100 Stat. 1848, 1848-1849 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510
(2012)).
53. See id.
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consistently gathers our geolocation data unfettered by statutory
restraints, there are only two federal statutes that directly address
the use of tracking devices, and they only apply to law enforcement. 54
The Pen/Trap Statute regulates the use of pen/trap devices, 55 and the
Stored Communications Act (SCA) also regulates storage of and
access to stored electronic communications. 56
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA) forbids communications service providers, such as Verizon
or Sprint, from producing “any information that may disclose the
physical location of the subscriber” when the provider is producing
call-identifying information pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute. 57
Thus, CALEA specifically limits information that providers may
produce to law enforcement pursuant to the Pen/Trap Statute. 58
The
SCA
authorizes
government
access
to
stored
communications in the hands of third-party providers.59 The SCA
categorizes different types of stored communications (i.e.,
information) and outlines what the government must do to obtain
access to those different types of communications.60 The protection
afforded by the SCA to these different types of information is based
upon the type of stored information sought. Addressing or dialing
information—which by system design is in the hands of the thirdparty provider for routing purposes—is afforded the least protection,
whereas “content” information—which refers to the actual substance
of the communication, whether email or voice call—is afforded the
greatest protection from surveillance.61
While this complex federal legislative scheme regulates both
private and government actors, it regulates these actors in different
ways.62 The scheme does not limit what personal information and
geolocation data the private actor or provider may collect, but it
limits what information the private actor may give the government
in the absence of court order.63 The scheme directly limits how and
what information the government may gather without court order. 64
The 2013 NSA surveillance revelations do, however, raise a serious
question as to whether the post-9/11 federal government and FISC
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2006); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006).
55. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
57. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006).
58. Id.
59. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012).
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id. § 2701-2703.
64. Id.
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consider themselves to be constrained by Title III.
C. Recent Supreme Court Privacy Decisions
Recent Supreme Court privacy decisions demonstrate the
judiciary’s understandable difficulty in navigating decisions
involving modern technologies.65 Some judges and several Supreme
Court Justices appear unaware of how modern Internet and cellular
communications function.66 The result has been disjointed and
narrow opinions providing little guidance for the government and
private industry in how to lawfully implement certain technologies.67
We are left with outdated jurisprudence that is counterintuitive and
ill-suited for the world we live in. But this is not the fault of the
judiciary nor does it reflect a lack of insight and intelligence on the
part of those grappling with these issues. Rather, via strongly
worded opinions, many in the judiciary have repeatedly called for
Congress to pass legislation that will protect individual privacy in
the face of evolving, increasingly intrusive electronic surveillance
technologies.68 Consider recent cases highlighting this disconnect
between the law and technology.
1. City of Ontario v. Quon
The Court’s struggle with understanding the capabilities of
advancing technologies was uncomfortably on display during oral
arguments in City of Ontario v. Quon.69 In Quon, the Court
considered whether Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT)
members have an expectation of privacy in personal text messages
sent on pagers issued by the city that employs them.70 The Justices’
struggle with the pager technology involved in the case was
awkward. Chief Justice Roberts asked what would happen if a text
message was sent to an officer at the same time he was sending a

65. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (stressing the
importance of exercising caution before establishing precedent which would “define the
existence, and extent, of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using
employer-provided communication devices”).
66. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (No.
08-1332),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1332.pdf.
67. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630, 2632 (adopting a narrow holding that a police
department’s search of an employee’s text messages sent from a cell phone owned and
issued by the employer was not unreasonable because it was conducted for a
“legitimate work-related purpose”); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949
(2012) (holding that the government violated a criminal suspect’s Fourth Amendment
rights when it “physically” intruded the suspect’s private property).
68. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (“In circumstances involving dramatic
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”).
69. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 66.
70. See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2624.
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text to someone else,71 at which point Justice Kennedy asked
whether the officer in that situation would receive “a voice mail
saying that your call is very important to us; we’ll get back to you.” 72
Later, Justices Roberts and Scalia grappled with the concept of a
service provider when they revealed they did not know that text
messages are sent to a service provider before reaching the intended
receiver.73 Such questions are particularly concerning because they
demonstrate that the Justices lack an understanding that, by design,
today’s technology discloses all of one’s personal information to third
parties.74 Accordingly, under the third-party doctrine established in
Smith v. Maryland in 1979,75 the vast majority of our electronic
information is unprotected.
2. United States v. Jones
In 2012, the Supreme Court took on law enforcement’s
warrantless use of GPS tracking devices. 76 In United States v. Jones,
the nine Justices unanimously ruled that law enforcement’s
warrantless attachment of a GPS device to a car and subsequent
warrantless use of that GPS device to track the location of a suspect
for a period of twenty-eight days constituted an unlawful search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.77 The majority opinion based its
holding on the act of trespass that occurred when police physically
attached the GPS device to the suspect’s vehicle.78
71. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 66 (“What happens, just out of
curiosity, if you’re -- he is on the pager and sending a message and they’re trying to
reach him for, you know, a SWAT team crisis? Does he -- does the one kind of trump
the other, or do they get a busy signal?”).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 48-49.
MR. DAMMEIER: Well, they -- they expect that some company, I’m
sure, is going to have to be processing the delivery of this message. And
-CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I didn’t -- I wouldn’t think that. I
thought, you know, you push a button; it goes right to the other thing.
(Laughter).
MR. DAMMEIER: Well -JUSTICE SCALIA: You mean it doesn’t go right to the other thing?
(Laughter).
Id.
74. See id.
75. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (stating that a person does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when that person voluntarily conveys
information by using the telephone and the phone company’s service).
76. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
77. See id. at 948-49.
78. See id. at 952. There were three opinions issued with the ruling: Justice Scalia
authored the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Sotomayor; Justice Sotomayor filed her own concurring opinion; and
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, filed a concurring
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The Jones decision is remarkable in many respects, but for
purposes of our discussion, there are three notable aspects of the
decision. First, given earlier beeper and GPS-based location tracking
decisions,79 it is striking that all nine Justices unanimously agreed
that the warrantless installation of a GPS tracking device on a
suspect’s car and subsequent tracking for twenty-eight days
constituted an impermissible search. 80 Second, although the Justices
were unanimous in their conclusion, the differences in the Justices’
rationales were stunning.81 And third, the Justices’ candidly open
struggle with certain issues reflects the growing quagmire at the
intersection of advancing technologies, privacy, and reasonable
expectations of privacy.82
In Jones, the majority held that the use of a GPS device to
conduct prolonged surveillance was unconstitutional only because of
the physical act of trespass on Jones’s property when the police
attached a GPS device to Jones’s car. 83 As Justice Sotomayor notes in
her concurring opinion, a search occurs “at a minimum” where the
government “physically intrud[es] on a constitutionally protected
area.”84 Her concurrence and Justice Alito’s concurrence acknowledge
very problematic limitations of the Court’s decisions: Advanced
capabilities of new technologies enable the collection of vast amounts
of data without a physical trespass.85
opinion as well.
79. For example, in United States v. Knotts, the Court held that the use of a beeper
to track Knotts’s location was constitutional since a person does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy on public thoroughfares because one’s movements are exposed
to the public. 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983). Additionally, police use of the beeper to
supplement their visual surveillance did not result in a Fourth Amendment violation.
Id. at 282. Rather, the Court stated: “Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited
the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.” Id.
80. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948-49.
81. Compare Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (“The Government physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such
a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”), with id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“In cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a
physical invasion on property, the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide
little guidance.”), and id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I would analyze the question
presented in this case by asking whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of
privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he
drove.”).
82. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (illustrating the Court’s struggle regarding
technology and privacy).
83. See id. at 949.
84. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 959 (Alito, J., concurring) (“‘[T]he search of one's home or office no longer
requires physical entry, for science has brought forth far more effective devices for the
invasion of a person's privacy than the direct and obvious methods of oppression which
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3. Florida v. Jardines
In Florida v. Jardines, police took a drug-sniffing dog to the front
porch of Jardines’s home where police suspected Jardines was
growing marijuana.86 The dog tracked a scent he had been trained to
detect and eventually sat, indicating that he had discovered the
odor’s strongest point.87 The Court considered whether using a drugsniffing dog on Jardines’s porch to investigate the contents of his
home constituted a search.88
In a five to four decision, Justice Scalia and the majority held
that the use of the dog on the front porch constituted a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the police “learned
what they learned only by physically intruding on Jardines’
property.”89 The majority did not consider the Katz analysis or the
use of a drug-sniffing dog as technology.90
Justice Kagan joined the majority, but adds in her concurrence
that she would have found the same outcome using the Katz analysis
and precedent in Kyllo v. United States,91 which held that where the
government uses technology “not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search.’”92 Justice
Kagan would have found that the police used technology not in
general public use (i.e., the drug-sniffing dog) to explore details of the
home.93
The dissenting Justices in Jardines, including the Chief Justice
and Justice Kennedy, found there was no physical trespass. 94
Notably, the dissent did not consider the dog to be technology; rather,
the dissenters said there was nothing that constituted trespass by
bringing the dog to Jardines’s front porch because “dogs have been
domesticated for about 12,000 years.”95

were detested by our forebears and which inspired the Fourth Amendment.’” (quoting
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting))).
86. 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
87. Id. The Court noted that “[t]he dog was trained to detect the scent of
marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and several other drugs, indicating the presence of any of
these substances through particular behavioral changes recognizable by his handler.”
Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1417.
90. Id.
91. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
92. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at
40). Kyllo involved the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device on one’s home,
which the Court found to be unconstitutional. 533 U.S. at 40.
93. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1419.
94. Id. at 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1420.
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Jardines, like the Jones decision before it, provides little
guidance to the electronic surveillance quagmire because it uses a
property-based approach, and thus, arguably does not apply to
technology capable of determining information without physical
intrusion upon property.96 Additionally, Justice Kagan’s concurrence
and reliance on Kyllo, in which the Court relied upon the
consideration of whether the thermal imaging technology at issue
was readily available to the public, demonstrates another weakness
in the Court’s privacy jurisprudence: Today, technology in general
public use evolves so rapidly that previously expensive, highly
invasive electronic surveillance technologies quickly become cheap,
readily available, and mainstream.97
Determining a technology’s availability to the public cannot form
the basis of whether a form of surveillance technology is
constitutionally permissible, because it does not take into account the
astounding pace of technological developments and the corresponding
affordability of highly sophisticated electronic surveillance devices. It
creates an unsustainable and uncertain legal rule, if followed. Why?
Because, in one year, use of a newer technology not in general public
use would be constitutionally impermissible, yet advancements
making the technology readily available to and affordable for the
public one year later would render use of that same technology
permissible simply because it had become widely available to the
public.
Drones are a perfect example. Five years ago, drones were not
generally available for private commercial purchase on the Internet.
Today, run a Google search using “drones for sale” as your search
term, and you will learn that any twelve-year-old with an Internet
connection and some babysitting money can find a drone readily
available for inexpensive purchase online.98
These discrepancies demonstrate that the property-based
approach and other judicial precepts used to determine whether use
of surveillance technology is constitutional (such as the third-party
doctrine or the readily-available-to-the-public consideration) are not
capable of creating clear precedent for courts. These approaches have
been acknowledged to be inadequate by the very judges struggling to
address and limit the capabilities of rapidly evolving modern
surveillance technologies that permit highly invasive, intrusive, and
surreptitious electronic surveillance.99
96. See id. at 1417; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953-54 (2012).
97. Colleen Kane, Want to Spy on Somebody? It’s Easier Than Ever, CNBC.COM
(Mar. 22, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100583418.
98. See Sara Qamar, If You Want Your Own Drone, They’re Available—and Legal,
MSNBC.COM (Aug. 21, 2013, 12:10 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/the-cycle/if-you-wantyour-own-drone-theyre-available.
99. See, e.g., Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring); Jones, 132 S. Ct.
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4. Maryland v. King
In June 2013, in another five to four decision, the Supreme Court
ruled in Maryland v. King that taking and analyzing a cheek swab of
an arrestee’s DNA following an arrest based upon probable cause
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 100 The Court weighed
the government interest in collecting the DNA against the privacy
intrusion.101 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found there
was a legitimate government interest in law enforcement’s need “to
process and identify the persons and possessions . . . take[n] into
custody” and to be able to do so “in a safe and accurate way.” 102 The
majority categorized the taking of DNA as a routine booking
procedure, similar to fingerprinting.103
The majority fails, however, to appreciate the distinction
between an intrusive procedure and intrusive information collected.
The majority described the collection of DNA by buccal swab as
requiring no “‘surgical intrusio[n] beneath the skin’” and one that
“poses no threat to the arrestee’s ‘health or safety.’” 104 Such a
distinction will apply to many existing and emerging technologies,
including—importantly—almost all other biometric identification
technology.105 Merely because a method of collection has improved or
become less intrusive does not necessarily negate or diminish the
intrusively private nature of the data collected. Fingerprinting, for
instance, provides a markedly sure and non-intrusive method of
identifying an individual. But it does not also provide the
government with intimate details about a detainee’s familial blood
relations, who the detainee’s parents and siblings are, what a
detainee’s genetic makeup is, what a detainee’s ancestry and country
of origin is, and whether a detainee is more likely to have cancer
than another individual due to their genetic makeup. 106 DNA
collection can permit all of this to be accomplished using existing
technologies.107

at 962; Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
100. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
101. Id. at 1976-78.
102. Id. at 1970.
103. Id. at 1976.
104. Id. at 1963 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)).
105. See infra Part III.C.
106. See
generally
Stephanie
Watson,
How
Fingerprinting
Works,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://science.howstuffworks.com/fingerprinting.htm (last visited
Nov. 21, 2013) (explaining the process of fingerprinting and how it is used in the
justice system).
107. See William Harris, What Can Your Spit Tell You About Your DNA?,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://science.howstuffworks.com/life/genetic/spit-dna.htm (last
visited Nov. 27, 2013); Shanna Freeman, How DNA Profiling Works,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://science.howstuffworks.com/dna-profiling.htm (last visited
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The dissent, written by Justice Scalia, firmly and correctly
condemns the majority opinion.108 He acknowledges that solving
crime is a noble objective, but emphasizes the troubling scope of the
majority’s holding:
Today’s judgment will, to be sure, have the beneficial effect of
solving more crimes; then again, so would the taking of DNA
samples from anyone who flies on an airplane (surely the
Transportation Security Administration needs to know the
“identity” of the flying public), applies for a driver’s license, or
attends a public school. Perhaps the construction of such a genetic
panopticon is wise. But I doubt that the proud men who wrote the
charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open their
mouths for royal inspection.109

King is yet another recent case wherein the Court struggles with
rapidly involving electronic surveillance and tracking technologies
and with defining protections that should be afforded individual
privacy in the face of a legislative void. The Justices could not be
clamoring more openly for legislative guidance.
III. SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES
Having set forth the existing constitutional, statutory, common
law, and judicial framework in place to protect individual privacy, we
will briefly overview the existing and emerging electronic
surveillance technologies currently in use by government and private
industry. These technologies permit the surreptitious collection,
storage, and sale of personal, intimate data on a scale that is difficult
to appreciate and comprehend because of the vastness and
pervasiveness of data collection in almost every activity of daily
living.
A. GPS Tracking110
GPS stands for Global Positioning System. GPS devices are
commercially available and readily affordable. 111 Typically, when one
Nov. 3, 2013).
108. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1989. The Panopticon to which Justice Scalia refers was first conceived
by Jeremy Bentham. See Ronald Collins, “Panopticon”? – Keep your eyes on the word!,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
5,
2013,
11:26
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/panopticon-keep-your-eyes-on-the-word/. The idea
is a prison designed with a central guard tower that may view all inmates housed
there. Id. At the same time, the prisoners have no view of who is watching them.
Eventually, the inmates modify their behavior to be in line with those who watch
them. Id.
110. Portions of this discussion have been excerpted from CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN &
ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING: SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET
AGE (Thomson Reuters ed., 4th ed. 2012).
111. GPS devices are available for less than $100. Marshall Brain & Tom Harris,
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refers to a “GPS” he or she is actually contemplating a GPS
receiver.112 The Global Positioning System is actually a constellation
of twenty-seven Earth-orbiting satellites.113
In simplistic terms, the GPS receiver, which is the actual
electronic tracking device attached or used, locates no less than four
of these orbiting satellites and computes the distance between itself
and each satellite by analyzing high-frequency, low-power radio
signals from the GPS satellites.114 Employing a mathematical
principle known as trilateration, the GPS receiver uses these
combined calculations to determine its own location.115
GPS reveals far more than a traditional electronic tracking
device; a standard GPS receiver provides not only a particular
location, but it also can, in real time, trace the person or thing’s path,
movement, and speed of movement.116 GPS devices also maintain
historical data recording the person or object’s movements. 117 If a
GPS receiver is left in “on” mode, it stays “in constant communication
with GPS satellites.”118
Thus, GPS can serve both passive tracking purposes (to locate a
person or an object) as well as real-time tracking purposes (to track
the movement of a person or object as it is actually occurring).119 This
distinction is referred to as passive monitoring, which describes
location-only purposes monitoring, and active monitoring, which is
described as realtime monitoring.120
The capabilities of a GPS device provide an almost endless list of
potential uses. In the last decade, the use of GPS devices has
proliferated to an extent difficult to sum up in words. 121 As discussed,
personal hand-held GPS devices are commercially available in most
electronic stores for far less than $100. 122 Most vehicles sold today
How
GPS
Receivers
Work,
HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gps.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2013). For that
amount of money, a consumer can purchase a pocket-sized or smaller gadget that
discerns one’s exact location on Earth at any moment.
112. Id.
113. Twenty-four of these satellites are in constant operation and three extra
satellites are maintained in space in the event of failure with one of the other twentyfour satellites. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See generally Fredericks v. Koehn, No. 06-cv-00957-MSK-KLM 2007 WL
2890466 (D. Colo. 2007), for a discussion of active and passive monitoring.
120. Id.
121. See M. Yanaklak & O. Baykal, Transformation of Ellipsoid Heights to Local
Leveling Heights, 127 J. SURV. ENG. 90, 90 (2001).
122. Brain & Harris, supra note 111.
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are GPS equipped. And, GPS devices are commonly used by
government and private employers to keep track of the whereabouts
of their employees and equipment.123 GPS ankle devices are also used
to track prisoners, both passively and actively. 124
For government purposes, the use of GPS devices and GPS
evidence is generally governed by the same statutes and case law
progeny as that which governs traditional electronic tracking
devices.125 However, federal tracking laws typically do not apply to
private industry’s use of GPS tracking technology.126
B. Cell Phones as Tracking Devices127
Cell phone technology permits cell service providers to easily use
the signals emitted by a cell phone to track real time cell site
location.
A cellular phone is no longer just a means of mobile
communication. More often than not, a cellular phone is capable of
functioning as a mobile telephone, a camera, a video recorder, a
text messaging device, a computer with Internet and e-mail
capabilities, a television, and an MP-3 player.128 These advances
are occurring so rapidly that they blur distinctions made by
legislatures and courts as to what is required to investigate, track,
and/or search and seize a cellular telephone [as opposed to a
computer].129

For tracking purposes, modern cell phones and smart phones
come standard-equipped with GPS-based tracking or geolocation
technology. Cell phones are still sometimes used to track an
individual’s location using triangulation, a process explained briefly
below.130 A cell phone operates like a two-way radio; it has a lowpower transmitter that operates in a network of cell sites. 131 The

123. See, e.g., Hinkley v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 249 Fed. Appx. 13 (10th Cir. 2007).
124. United States v. Freeman, 479 F.3d 743, 745 (10th Cir. 2007); Koehn, 2007 WL
2890466, at *2.
125. Ryan Gallagher, The Spy Who GPS-Tagged Me, SLATE.COM (Nov. 9, 2012, 8:33
AM),
www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2012/11/gps_trackers_to_monitor_cheati
ng_spouses_a_legal_gray_area_for_private_investigators.html.
126. Id.
127. Portions of this discussion have been excerpted from FISHMAN & MCKENNA,
supra note 110.
128. “Blackberries and i-Phones are two examples of the newer, multipurpose model
of a cellular phone.” Id. at VI § 28:2 n.1.
129. Id. at VI § 28:2.
130. Id. at VI § 29:37.
131. In re Application for Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750–51 (S.D. Tex.
2005). For a general background on cell phones, see S. REP. NO. 99-541 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3563; Tom Farley, Cellular Telephone Basics,
PRIVATELINE: TELECOMMUNICATIONSO EXPERTISE (Jan. 1, 2006, 8:55 PM)
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word “cell” refers to geographic regions.132 A “cell site” is where the
radio transceiver and base station controller are located (at the point
where three hexagons meet).133 Thus, a cell site lies at the edge of
several cells, not at the center of a cell.134
The cell site or tower constantly sends and receives traffic from
the cell phones in its geographic area to what is called a Mobile
Telecommunications Switching Office (MTSO), which handles all
phone connections and controls all the base stations (or towers) in a
given region.135
Cellular service providers’ computers automatically keep track of
the identity of all the cell towers serving a phone at any given time
and the aspect of each tower facing the phone.136 By triangulating the
cell signals and towers, a cell phone’s location can be precisely
pinpointed.137 Triangulation permits both real-time and historical
tracking of cell phones.138
In conclusion, whether using GPS technology or triangulation,
the cell phones we carry with us everywhere provide private industry
with an always “on” form of tracking our location.139 Moreover, the
software with which our phones come preloaded and the mobile apps
we download onto our phones more often than not surreptitiously
record our GPS information and send that information back to the
app supplier.140
C. Biometrics141
“Biometrics” is a general term that is used interchangeably to
describe a characteristic or a process. 142 As a characteristic,

http://www.privateline.com/mt_cellbasics/index.html.
132. Farley, supra note 131.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. For an illustrative demonstration, see Cellular 9-1-1 Triangulation Method,
ALABAMA
NATIONAL
EMERGENCY
NUMBER
ASSOCIATION,
http://www.al911.org/wireless/triangulation (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
137. Id.
138. Cell Phone Tower Triangulation, INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATORS, INC.,
http://www.iiiweb.net/forensic-services/cell-phone-tower-triangulation/ (last visited
Nov. 21, 2013).
139. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual Worlds
Govern Everyday Life, 27 BERK. TECH. L.J. 55, 91 (2012).
141. Portions of this discussion have been excerpted from FISHMAN & MCKENNA,
supra note 110.
142. For a definition of “biometrics,” developed by the National Science &
Technology Council’s (NTSC) 2006 Subcommittee on Biometrics, see Biometrics
Glossary, BIOMETRICS.GOV, http://www.biometrics.gov/documents/glossary.pdf (last
visited Nov. 21, 2013).
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biometrics is defined as “[a] measurable biological (anatomical and
physiological) and behavioral characteristic that can be used for
automated recognition.”143 As a process, biometrics is defined as
“[a]utomated methods of recognizing an individual based on
measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral
characteristics.”144
“In 1907, the Department of Justice (DOJ) established a Bureau
of Criminal Identification,” which was “based upon fingerprints.” 145
In 1924, the DOJ tasked the precursor of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) with creating a national identification and
criminal history system.146 This led to today’s Criminal Justice
Information Services (CJIS) of the FBI.147 By the 1960s, the United
States had created automated technology for the storage and
comparison of prints.148 Digitization in the 1980s and early 1990s
further increased the ease and efficiency of fingerprints as a
biometric identifier, and by the end of the twentieth century,
fingerprint identification had become the norm for governments
around the world. 149
In the 1990s, private industry and the United States government
earnestly invested in developing new biometric identification
technologies.150 The early 1990s saw the beginnings of face
recognition software development, and in 1993, “the [Department of
Defense] initiated [its] Face Recognition Technology . . . program.151
In 1994, “[t]he first patent granted for automated iris recognition . . .
was issued.”152 In 1996, the United States Army implemented “realtime video face identification.”153
In 2000, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) “initiated the Human Identification at a Distance
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY MGMT., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
THE
NATIONAL
BIOMETRICS
CHALLENGE
5
(2011),
available
at
http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/BiometricsChallenge2011_protected.pdf.
146. Kenneth R. Moses et al., Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS),
in NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 6-1, 6-4 (Alan McRoberts &
Debbie McRoberts eds., 2011), available at https://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225320.pdf.
147. SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY MGMT., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
supra note 145.
148. Moses et al., supra note 146.
149. Nat’l Sci. and Tech. Council Subcomm. on Biometrics and Identity Mgmt,
Biometrics
Glossary,
BIOMETRICS.GOV,
http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/BioHistory.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
150. See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 419 (2012).
151. Id. at 423.
152. Id. at 419 n.39.
153. Id. at 423.
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Program.”154 “The goal [of this program] was to develop algorithms
for locating and acquiring subjects up to 150 meters . . . away, [by
combining] face and gait recognition [technologies] . . . .”155 The
stated “purpose of [this] program was to provide early warning . . .
for force protection . . . against terrorism and crime.”156
The events of 9/11 ushered in dramatic changes in the use of
biometrics and in funding for advancements in biometric
technology.157 9/11 also provided the impetus for homeland securityrelated legislation that, with little constitutional consideration,
funded the development and implementation of biometric
identification systems and authorized the collection (by both overt
and covert means), retention, and sharing 158 of individual biometric
data.159 In describing the impact of 9/11 on government-conducted
electronic surveillance, one commentator noted:
In this process, there is a widening of surveillance, with a wide
range of personal data being collected for the purposes of
securitized immigration control and a wide range of government
agencies (and not only immigration agencies) having access to such
data, as well as a deepening of surveillance (via the collection of
extremely sensitive categories of personal data, including
biometrics) . . .Great emphasis [is] placed on the widening and
deepening of information collection and sharing (including . . .
biometrics) from a variety of sources.160

The astonishingly rapid developments in biometric identification
systems have revolutionized government, military, and private
industry’s security systems and means of identification of persons. 161
The use of biometrics and emerging biometric technologies continues
to alter and change the way persons are and can be identified and, in
turn, the way persons can be tracked and subjected to surveillance. 162
154. Id. at 423-24.
155. Id. at 424.
156. Id. This program is one of the first examples of transition to biometric
identification via remote technology. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS IN
GOVERNMENT POST-9/11: ADVANCING SCIENCE, ENHANCING OPERATIONS 18 (Heather
Rosenker
&
Megan
Hirshey
eds.,
2008),
available
at
http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/Biometrics%20in%20Government%20Post%20911.pdf.
157. Donohue, supra 150, at 425.
158. See id. at 427-28. As a result of post-9/11 legislative changes, this sharing of
data amongst government agencies occurs both horizontally (between federal agencies)
and vertically (between federal and state and local governments). See id. at 416, 410,
459-61.
159. See Valsamis Mitsilegas, Immigration Control in an Era of Globalization:
Deflecting Foreigners, Weakening Citizens, Strengthening the State, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 3, 12 (2012).
160. Id. at 12-13.
161. See Donohue, supra note 150, at 410.
162. See id. For instance, in Israel, a security technology firm partnered with an
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For instance, the technological advances in the biometric
identification system known as face or facial recognition and the
corresponding relatively recent ability of government and private
industry to surreptitiously collect, retain, and access hundreds of
millions of individuals’ facial biometric data have coalesced to permit
the almost immediate identification of individual “faces in a crowd
and three-dimensional face recognition.”163 Government and private
industry have developed a variety of handheld mobile devices that
permit collection and wireless verification of identity via fingerprint
biometrics, face biometrics, and iris scanning. 164
Thus, low cost “biometric handheld devices now make it possible
to obtain rapid identification virtually anywhere.” 165 Most people
seem unaware of how private industry uses biometrics to identify
and track individuals’ locations, preferences, and associates. 166
IV. USE OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY BY PRIVATE INDUSTRY
A. Cellular Telephones and GPS Tracking 167
It is common knowledge that mobile software applications collect
more personal data from our smart phones than they need or should.
One such example is Apple’s much-touted Siri: There was a media
uproar when it became known that Siri was surreptitiously collecting
our geolocation data, search requests, address books, recording the
sound of our voices (and using voice recognition biometric technology
to “remember” us), and sending the information back to Apple. 168
Israeli company, i-Mature, to create Age-Group Recognition (AGR) software that
requires a computer user to submit to a scan of a finger bone to determine age prior to
accessing certain websites. See Press Release, EMC Corporation, RSA Security and iMature Partner on Next-Generation Biometric Technology to Further Protect Children
on
the
Internet
(Feb.
7,
2005),
available
at
http://latinamerica.rsa.com/press_release.aspx?id=5497.
163. SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY MGMT., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
supra note 145, at 12.
164. Id. at 13.
165. Id. at 19.
166. See Lisa Vaas, Apple’s Siri Voiceprints Raise Privacy Concerns, NAKED
SECURITY,
SOPHOS
(June
28,
2012),
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/06/28/apples-siri-voiceprints-raise-privacyconcerns/ (asserting that IBM employees unaware of security risks from use of mobile
device apps).
167. See Anne T. McKenna, FTC’s December 10, 2012 Report: Mobile Apps for Kids:
Disclosures Still Not Making the Grade, INTERNET, SOCIAL MEDIA AND PRIVACY LAW
BLOG,
SILVERMCKENNA,
(Jan.
18,
2013),
http://www.internetprivacylawblog.com/2013/01/ftcs_december_10_2012_report_m.htm
l; see also PRWeb, FTC Releases New, Troubling Report On What’s Being Done With
Children’s Private Information says Anne McKenna From Baltimore Law Firm
Silverman,
Thompson,
Slutkin
&
White,
(Dec.
13
2013),
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/12/prweb10236296.htm.
168. Vaas, supra note 166.
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Privacy policies provide no assurances: Most mobile apps’
privacy policies shroud the app’s data collection practices in a
byzantine collection of legal terms, and most individuals do not read
the policies.169 Smart phones, from which we check our email, surf
the web, access Facebook, make calls, and do work, are loaded with
numerous software programs that use the phone’s built-in GPS or
geolocation technology ostensibly to better serve our needs (“Where is
the closest Starbucks? What is my current location? Where are my
friends? Where was that photo taken?”). However, our geolocation
data is also extremely valuable to private industry. 170 Software that
collects such data enables the software app developer or owner to sell
our geolocation and other collected data to third parties for purposes
of marketing and targeted advertising.171
In December 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued
a report that illustrates the potentially insidious and highly invasive
nature of such surreptitious data collection by private industry. 172
The FTC’s detailed report revealed that the most popular children’s
mobile software apps are surreptitiously collecting and then selling
to hundreds of marketers and third parties information regarding
where our children physically are at all times, what their mobile
phone numbers are, and where they go and what they do online, and
are doing so without notice to parent or child.173 Replete with
research and data, the report demonstrates that the most popular
mobile software apps designed for, marketed to, and used by our
children are doing all of this, and in so doing, may be running afoul of
numerous federal consumer protection, deceptive advertising, and
privacy laws.174
The December 2012 report is a follow-up to a February 2012
report wherein the FTC surmised that there may be significant
privacy issues with mobile apps designed for and targeted to
children.175 After releasing the February 2012 report, the FTC did its
homework: It investigated 400 popular children’s mobile software
apps, reviewed the apps’ stated privacy policies, and tested the apps’
actual data collection and tracking practices. 176 What it found is

169. FED. TRADE COMM’N, Mobile Apps for Kids: Disclosures Still Not Making the
Grade
8
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/12/121210mobilekidsappreport.pdf.
170. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Mobile Apps for Kids: Current Privacy Disclosures Are
Disappointing
1
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/02/120216mobile_apps_kids.pdf.
171. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 169, at 3.
172. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 169.
173. Id. at 8.
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id. at 1.
176. Id. at 5.
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troubling.177
First, the FTC noted that only twenty percent of the 400
children’s mobile software apps it investigated—most of which are
available, and supposedly vetted, through Apple and Google’s
respective mobile app stores—even provided disclosures about their
data collection practices.178 Those twenty percent that did so
employed links to long, verbose, technically-detailed privacy policies
beyond the average adult user’s ken, much less that of a child. 179
Overwhelmingly, the vast majority of the investigated children’s
apps, even those with stated privacy policies, failed to provide any
information about the general data collected, the type of data
collected, the purpose of the data collection, and who would and could
obtain access to the data.180 Worse still, most apps routinely and
actively shared the phone number of the child’s device, the precise
location of the child’s device (and thus, the child), and the unique
identification code of the device with numerous third parties. 181
Notably, while one app’s privacy policy claimed that it did not
transmit any information to third parties, a quick look by the FTC
revealed that it in fact transmitted the three pieces of information
listed above.182
The immediate and invasive nature of private data collected and
transmitted to third parties is both astonishing and frightening. For
instance, the FTC noted that “[o]ne app . . . transmitted [the child’s]
geolocation information to two separate ad networks within the first
second of the app’s use.”183 Being a diligent parent or guardian does
not stop data gathering.184 Why? Because the FTC found that many
of the apps it reviewed failed to advise parents when the app
contained interactive features like advertising, social network
sharing, and allowing children to purchase virtual goods within the
app.185 The FTC found the apps that linked, without disclosure, to
social media sites to be particularly troubling, noting that children
could “communicate with other users who they have never met or . . .
post information about themselves or their whereabouts.”186
Mobile apps that allow children to upload photos or that record
children’s voices without advising parents of social media linkage

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8 n.23.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 13 n.27.
See id. at 7.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 20.
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enable another potentially insidious privacy violation. 187 Social media
sites that use or have used face or voice recognition software to
surreptitiously scan and record users’ facial biometrics or voice
biometrics for future identification and marketing purposes are
potentially storing this information.188 This means that marketers
might be able to track children’s whereabouts via their facial
biometrics in public places, like malls, even when a child does not
have a mobile device on his or her person.189
The FTC found that over fifty percent of the 400 popular
children’s mobile apps it investigated were transmitting children’s
data to various third parties, often marketers. 190 While a mere nine
percent of the children’s apps reviewed willingly admitted to parents
that the apps contained advertising targeted to children prior to
download, the FTC found that fifty-eight percent of the apps
reviewed were actually advertising to the child users. 191
According to news sources, prominent media companies want the
FTC to reduce its restrictions for children and online privacy
protection because of the vast marketing income the child market
presents,192 whereas child and privacy advocates argue that this
detailed collection of data, including the child’s photo, voice
recordings and unique device identification codes, will enable
marketers and advertisers to track children wherever they go, both
online and off.193 Right now, according to the FTC, the law may be on
the side of the privacy advocates. The FTC is investigating whether a
majority of these popular children’s apps could be violating numerous
laws, including the FTC’s prohibition against unfair or deceptive
marketing practices, federal consumer protection statutes, and the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). 194

187. See, e.g., Carmen Aguado, Facebook or Face Bank?, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
187, 192-93 (2012).
188. Id.
189. Id. For further discussion of the use of biometrics, see infra Part IV.B.
190. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 169, at 6.
191. Id. at 6, 16.
192. Cf. Julia Cohn, How ‘Do Not Track’ May Hurt Businesses, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct.
8, 2012), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/224611 (positing that companies are
paid more for placing targeted, behavioral ads on their websites than they are for
placing non-targeted, contextual ads); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND
POLICYMAKERS:
FTC
REPORT
7
(2012),
available
at
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf
(“[M]any commenters raised
concerns about how wider privacy protections would affect innovation and the ability
to offer consumers beneficial new products and services.”).
193. See Bianca Bosker, Facebook Buys Facial Recognition Firm Face.com: What It
Wants With Your Face, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 19, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/19/facebook-buys-face-com_n_1608996.html.
194. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 169, at 5.
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What are the potential legal consequences? Litigation will be
plentiful. Consumer protection statutes are often written with per
violation damages;195 thus, the repeated surreptitious, undisclosed
data collection of intimate details of potentially millions of children’s
daily activities, whereabouts, and contact information may amount to
staggering damage figures.196
B. Biometrics Combined with Internet Tracking: Money for
Private Industry
For private industry, biometric identification has several
advantages over traditional methods of identification such as
passwords, personal identification numbers (PINs), and ID cards.197
A person might lose or forget a password or PIN, or an unauthorized
person may find or learn it and misuse it; an ID card may be lost or
forged.198 Biometric identification, by contrast, is not susceptible to
these problems,199 because it is based upon intrinsic characteristics of
an individual that are extremely difficult to duplicate and are not
dependent on human memory.200
What exactly does biometrics do for private industry? Without
even using biometrics, a retailer can already buy or figure out the
following information from an individual’s online activity:
[Y]our age, whether you are married and have kids, which part of
town you live in, how long it takes you to drive to the store, your
estimated salary, whether you’ve moved recently, what credit cards
you carry in your wallet and what Web sites you visit. Target can
buy data about your ethnicity, job history, the magazines you read,
if you’ve ever declared bankruptcy or got divorced, the year you
bought (or lost) your house, where you went to college, what kinds
of topics you talk about online, whether you prefer certain brands
of coffee, paper towels, cereal or applesauce, your political leanings,
reading habits, charitable giving and the number of cars you
own.201

195. See, e.g., Justin Dingfelder & Sandra Brickels, To Protect Consumers, the FTC
Means Business, 45 FED. LAW. 24, 26 (1998).
196. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of
Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 12 n.46 (2012).
197. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY MGMT., NAT’L SCI. & TECH.
COUNCIL, supra note 145, at 22.
198. See, e.g., id.
199. Unless, of course, things develop along the lines of the 2002 Spielberg movie,
Minority Report, in which the character played by Tom Cruise has his eyes surgically
removed and replaced with those of another person so he can fool retinal scanners as
to his identity. He keeps his own eyes, too, however, so he can pass as himself when it
suits him. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox et al. 2002).
200. See SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY MGMT., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
supra note 145, at 29.
201. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG., (Feb.
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Linking such information further to biometric data does not just
have huge marketing and retailing implications; 202 it has significant
privacy implications. Absent any changes in federal legislation,
biometric advances have provided marketers and retailers the
opportunity to identify exactly who someone is when they walk into
any store that operates surveillance cameras. 203 As discussed below,
online search engines, like Google, and social media sites, like
Facebook, have already begun gathering, storing, and using
hundreds of millions of users’ facial biometrics.204 Under current
laws and most social media user agreement provisions, an individual
does not always own or retain a right to privacy in his or her
biometric data.205
Why is this being done? Because collected, stored, and accessible
biometric data provides vast potential for financial gain for
international, national, and local private entities. 206 Government and
private industry’s significant investments in biometric technologies
and the increasingly vast collection of biometric data appear
discordant with fundamental American notions of privacy, but
Congress has been silent on the issue.207
As mentioned, social media sites, the present and future hub
of very targeted and often user-unaware advertising,208 acquire,
organize, store, and access biometric data from users with a
particular focus on facial biometrics collected via face recognition
software.209 Consider Facebook: In June of 2011, Facebook launched
a “tag suggestion” feature—ostensibly for the benefit of its users—
that prompts users with tagging suggestions for images of
individuals contained in the photos that Facebook users upload. 210
Although Facebook played coy with the facts, it clearly had already
been utilizing some form of face recognition biometric software for
some time.211 Otherwise, it could not have launched a ready-to-go
16,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shoppinghabits.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
202. See id.
203. See,
e.g.,
Check-ins
Get
a
Facelift,
REDPEPPER,
http://redpepperland.com/lab/details/check-in-with-your-face (last visited Nov. 24,
2013).
204. See, e.g., Aguado, supra note 187.
205. See Joseph Loreno Hall, Facial Recognition & Privacy: An EU-US Perspective,
CTR.
FOR
DEMOCRACY
&
TECH.
(Oct.
8,
2012),
available
at
https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT_facial_recog.pdf.
206. See Cohn, supra note 192.
207. See Aguado, supra note 187, at 223. But see FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note
192, at 4-5.
208. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 192, at 40.
209. See id. at 45.
210. Aguado, supra note 187, at 188.
211. See id. at 198.
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tagging tool that provided automatic identification of millions of
individuals in photographs and videos uploaded to Facebook. 212 Since
the 2011 launch, Facebook has acknowledged that it has gathered,
collected, stored, and used the biometric data of millions and millions
of individuals around the world through the use of facial recognition
software.213
When one considers Facebook’s use statistics, the sheer quantity
of biometric data gathered by Facebook is staggering. Facebook
presently boasts 1.15 billion users worldwide;214 it is the second mostvisited site on the Internet;215 approximately 699 million Facebook
users log into their accounts daily; 216 and every twenty-four hours
Facebook users upload over 300 million photos. 217 What does this
means for privacy and the collection of biometric data? Facebook
probably has the largest privately held digital collection of facial
biometrics of hundreds of millions of people across the globe. 218 Thus,
by using face recognition, Facebook and other social media sites
employing face biometrics have gathered a tremendously valuable
marketing commodity—your facial biometrics.219
Social media’s use of facial biometrics is not the future, it is now:
“[S]ome companies are already using facial recognition technology to
identify clothing in images posted online, and Facebook might wield
Face.com’s technology to tag brands and retailers shown in users’
pictures . . . . That could evolve into a tool that automatically tags
Coca-Cola cans or Levi’s jeans as a way of increasing visibility for
Facebook advertisers.”220
V. HOW MODERN SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY CONFOUNDS THE
EXISTING PRIVACY LAW FRAMEWORK
A. Reasonableness of Intrusion and Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy: A Problem
The line of cases discussed above demonstrates how our judiciary
is confounded by new technologies. Consider reasonableness: Courts

212. See id. at 188-90.
213. See id. at 188.
214. Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-facts (last visited Nov. 26,
2013).
215. Top Sites, Alexa, http://www.alexa.com/topsites (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
216. FACEBOOK, supra note 214.
217. Rick Armbrust, Capturing Growth: Photo Apps and Open Graph, FACEBOOK
(July
17,
2012,
1:00
PM),
https://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2012/07/17/capturing-growth--photo-appsand-open-graph/.
218. See Aguado, supra note 187, at 195-96.
219. Id. at 214.
220. Bosker, supra note 193.
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determine the reasonableness of a search by weighing “the promotion
of legitimate governmental interests” against “the degree to which
[the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.” 221 But the
current standard to gauge the degree of intrusion upon individual
privacy is ill-suited to modern technology. For example, in King, the
police used a buccal swab inside a person’s cheek to obtain a DNA
sample. While the method of retrieving the information is “quick and
painless,” the type of information collected is very intrusive,
providing the government with access to one’s genetic identity,
genetic markers, and family genetic history.222
Today, methods for collecting information are considerably more
surreptitious yet less intrusive than methods used in the past to
gather the same data. Consider the Jones decision: The GPS tracking
device surreptitiously collected far more data than a “tiny constable”
would have ever been able to collect in the past. 223 By considering
how intrusive the collection device is, courts fail to grasp that newer
technologies require far less intrusion while simultaneously
collecting far greater amounts of highly personal data, which a
reasonable person would find far more intrusive (provided he or she
understood the quantity of data being collected; for instance, consider
whether an arrestee understands the quantity of information
gathered in a DNA collection via a buccal swab).
This trend will continue. For instance, numerous retail stores
employ technology that allows retailers to track, and thereby learn
more about, their customers’ behavior in their stores. 224 There are
many variations of the technology, but most track customers’
movements by following the Wi-Fi signals from their smart
phones.225 Unless the store informs the customers that they are being
tracked in this manner, there is no reason a customer would know
they are being monitored. This is a very nonintrusive collection
method; yet it collects detailed information such as a customer’s
gender and age, whether they are a repeat customer, how long they
are in the lingerie section, and what hemorrhoid or vaginal cream
they quietly pick up or put down.226 Regardless of the fact that the
collection method is nonintrusive, the scope and extent of
information collected would be considered by many to violate their
reasonable expectation of privacy and, thus, be a privacy intrusion.
221. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
222. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1962 (2013).
223. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 n.3 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
224. Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention, Shoppers: Store is Tracking
Your
Cell,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
15,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/business/attention-shopper-stores-are-trackingyour-cell.html.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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A startling example of biometric-based tracking for advertising
purposes is “Facedeals.” Redpepper, the advertising agency behind
Facedeals, has successfully marketed to businesses small cameras
equipped with face recognition software that scan the facial
biometrics of every single customer who walks into a business. 227 If
the particular customer’s facial biometrics are identified from an
almost instantaneous cross-comparison with Facebook’s vast
collection of individuals’ face biometrics, the identified individual is
sent a “Facedeal,” via Facebook, for the particular business.228 This
may be a sale on shirts or a drink special. “The cameras are
standalone devices developed around open source technologies
including Raspberry Pi, Arduino, OpenCV, and the Facebook Graph
API [Application-Programming Interface]. They can be configured
remotely and require a standard 110 volt wall outlet and a wifi [sic]
connection.”229
The very nature of the Internet and satellite-based structure
upon which modern communication and many digital devices
function requires that we overhaul or discard the third party doctrine
articulated in Smith v. Maryland.230 Because of the platform upon
which cell phone and Internet activity is conducted, there is little to
no information undisclosed to a third party. 231
Justices Sotomayor and Alito both raise this issue in their
concurring opinions in Jones. Justice Sotomayor explicitly questions
the third-party doctrine, stating:

227. FACEDEALS, http://redpepperland.com/lab/details/check-in-with-your-face (last
visited Nov. 26, 2013).
228. Id.
229. WAYBACK
MACHINE,
http://web.archive.org/web/20130516165234/http://redpepperland.com/lab/details/check
-in-with-your-face (containing an archived snapshot of the Oct. 6, 2013 version of the
Facedeals website) (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
230. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that the defendant’s
disclosure of telephone numbers dialed out to the telephone provider was a third-party
disclosure and, thus, not subject to Fourth Amendment protection).
231. Although users can in some instances control their privacy settings or limit
who can access their posted content, because most postings to social media sites such
as Facebook and Twitter typically are accessible to large numbers of individuals,
courts recognize a reduced expectation of privacy in social media activity. Applying the
third-party doctrine, courts rule that the users of social media have voluntarily
submitted the data to a third party, and thus cannot claim any expectation of privacy
in that data, even in instances where such data (e.g., location data) is being collected
surreptitiously. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 130 (E.D. Va. 2011) (holding that the thirdparty doctrine destroys any reasonable expectation of privacy in the location data
because the Twitter users voluntarily provided that data to Twitter); see also People v.
Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 508 (Crim. Ct. 2012) (finding that a Twitter user did not
have a proprietary interest in his tweets upon agreeing to Twitter’s terms at the time
the account was created).
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More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is
ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers
that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they
visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their
Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and
medications they purchase to online retailers.232

The reasonable expectation of privacy test, first articulated in
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,233 has
been criticized by scholars throughout its existence. And in Jones,
Justices Sotomayor and Alito both suggest that the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard needs to be reevaluated. 234 Justice
Alito condemns the Jones majority’s use of the trespass doctrine to
hold that the physical attachment of the GPS device constituted an
unlawful trespass; instead, Justice Alito concludes the Court could
have reached the same outcome applying Katz.235 But he
acknowledges the difficulties presented in applying Katz to more
advanced technologies:
[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical
reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy
expectations. But technology can change those expectations.
Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which
popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce
significant changes in popular attitudes.236

Justice Alito then strongly urges Congress to enact legislation as
it did with respect to wiretapping following Katz and the events of
Watergate.237
Our jurisprudence is not the only problem: Justice Alito and
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrences both make clear that the United
States lacks a comprehensive approach to privacy policy, because
Congress has failed to pass a technologically-adaptive legislative

232. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
233. To determine one’s reasonable expectation of privacy, courts must first
consider the subjective prong, which requires that the individual “exhibit[] an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy” in the location searched, and then evaluate the
objective prong, which determines whether that “expectation [is] one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
234. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., and Alito, J.,
concurring).
235. Id. at 962.
236. Id. at 963.
237. Id.
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privacy scheme.238 Not only has Congress not provided legislative
guidance, it has failed to amend existing legislation to reflect the
realities of modern surveillance capabilities. In Quon, Jones,
Jardines, and King, the Justices have made it clear: They are not
equipped to develop a judicial approach that preserves traditional
concepts of privacy in the face of technological development without
legislative guidance.
B. Government Surveillance and Pending Privacy Legislation
In the summer of 2013, The Guardian released a series of
articles revealing NSA programs used to spy on Americans. We
learned that the NSA, through a secret order issued by the FISA
court, is collecting the metadata of millions of Verizon customers on a
daily basis.239 The revelations also brought to light the vast scale of
information that the NSA and the FBI also collect through a
program, code-named PRISM, which taps directly into central
servers of leading U.S. Internet companies.240 PRISM collects “audio
and video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection
logs that enable analysts to track foreign targets.” 241 But it does so by
the surreptitious and warrantless collection of the electronic data of
American citizens, ostensibly to keep us safe from foreign nationals
and terrorists. The frightening flipside of this surveillance is the
Obama Administration’s notoriously hard stance towards those
individuals who whistleblow about the government’s surreptitious
surveillance programs. 242
238. Id. at 964.
239. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers
Daily,
THE
GUARDIAN
(June
5,
2013),
http://www.thegaurdian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-recrods-verizon-court-order.
240. Among them are “Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype,
YouTube and Apple.” Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence
Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH.
POST (June 6, 2013) http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligencemining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secretprogram/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html.
241. Id.
242. Another interesting and noteworthy piece to this puzzle is the Obama
Administration’s manner in dealing with national security leaks. Since 1971, when
Daniel Ellsberg revealed documents known as the Pentagon Papers, very few
presidents have gone after whistleblowers as aggressively as President Obama. John
Dean, Dealing with National Security Leaks: Obama’s “Plumbers,” VERDICT: LEGAL
ANALYSIS
AND
COMMENTARY
FROM
JUSTIA
(June
14,
2013),
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/06/14/dealing-with-national-security-leaks-obamasplumbers-2. Prior to 2008, President Nixon prosecuted Daniel Ellsberg, President
Reagan prosecuted Samuel Morrison (who was later pardoned by President Clinton),
and President Bush prosecuted Lawrence Franklin. Id. Since Obama has taken office,
six whistleblowers have been prosecuted (although two of those six investigations
began during the Bush Administration). Id. Currently, the Obama Administration is
investigating Julian Assange of Wikileaks, Stephen Jin Woo Kim, and Edward
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Since the NSA surveillance story broke in June 2013, there have
been several knee-jerk legislative proposals.243 Such pending
legislation is more of a band-aid than a solution to the pervasive and
secret surveillance conducted by the government. With none of the
bills gaining real traction,244 it is unlikely that meaningful legislation
will be passed to address the government’s circumvention of the
Constitution and statutory law. It seems even more unlikely that
legislation will be passed to give consumers greater control over
private industry’s collection, use, and sale of their personal, private
data.
Instead, Congress is attempting to pass legislation that would
directly subvert current limits on the methods by which the
government can obtain privately held information. 245 The Cyber
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act bill (CISPA) was first
introduced in 2012 and again in 2013. 246 Proponents hail CISPA as a
Snowden, who is responsible for the NSA surveillance leaks. Id.
243. For example, Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) proposed legislation that would require
the federal government to have “a warrant based on probable cause” in order to seize
phone records from Americans. See Sabrina Siddiqui, Rand Paul Introduces Bill to
Prevent Government Seizure of Phone Records Amid NSA Controversy, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 7, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/07/rand-paulnsa_n_3404308.html?1370631146. Senators Mark Udall (D-Colo.) and Ron Wyden (DOre.), who long warned of the government’s surveillance methods, are seeking to limit
the government's authority to collect data. See Sabrina Siddiqui, Mark Udall, Ron
Wyden Introduce Bill Limiting Federal Government’s Authority to Collect Data,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(June
14,
2013,
4:43
PM)
http://huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/14/mark-udall-ron-wydennsa_n_3442054.html?utm_hp_ref=politics. Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Or.) and Mike Lee
(R-Utah) co-sponsored a bill that would declassify FISA court opinions. See Luke
Johnson, FISA Bill Introduced to Declassify Court Opinions Used to Justify
Surveillance,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(June
11,
2013)
http://huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/11/fisa-bill_n_3421407.html. And, on June 24, 2013,
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) introduced legislation to
revisit the Patriot Act Section 215 and FISA Amendment Act Section 702, under which
the NSA programs are lawful. See Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement of
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
On Introduction of the FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013 Senate
Floor (June 24, 2013), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/statement-ofsenator-patrick-leahy-d-vt-chairman-us-senate-committee-on-the-judiciary-onintroduction-of-the-fisa-accountability-and-privacy-protection-act-of-2013-senate-floor.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/28/nsa-bills_n_3516928.html.
244. See Sabrina Siddiqui, NSA Surveillance Prompts Several Bills But Little Action
in
Congress,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(June
28,
2013,
5:10
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/28/nsa-bills_n_3516928.html (stating that “the
Merkley-Lee bill has gained the most traction with 12 cosponsors”).
245. See Melissa Riofrio, It’s Privacy Versus Cybersecurity as CISPA Bill Arrives in
Senate,
PC
WORLD,
(Apr.
25,
2013,
3:00
AM)
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2036328/it-s-privacy-versus-cybersecurity-as-cispa-billarrives-in-senate.html.
246. See Alina Selyukh and Deboarah Charles, CISPA Cybersecurity Bill Backers
Hope Second Time’s a Charm, NBC NEWS (May 16, 2013, 8:38 AM),
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means to prevent cyber-attacks.247 As currently drafted, however,
CISPA makes sweeping changes to the law of electronic privacy
because it permits data sharing between private industry and the
government on an unprecedented scale and without any penalty for
doing so.248 The limitations of the Fourth Amendment and already
existing statutory law are circumvented because the government
grants immunity to companies that participate.249
The NSA programs are already justified on thin legal grounds.250
Legislation such as CISPA attempts to codify and make legal the
government’s circumventing Fourth Amendment privacy rights. 251
The NSA surveillance programs and proposed legislation like CISPA
demonstrate the need for comprehensive legislation to protect the
collection, use, and sale of consumer private data, and to be effective,
such legislation must apply in a parallel fashion to government and
private industry.252 No such legislation exists, however, nor is there
any real proposal for such legislation. 253
It is the result of this legislative and judicial void that private
industry, using readily available technologies, tracks individuals. 254

http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/cispa-cybersecurity-bill-backers-hope-secondtimes-charm-1C9948195.
247. See id. (discussing CISPA support from members of the Cabinet and Congress);
see also Matt Peckham, 5 Reasons the CISPA Cybersecurity Bill Should Be Tossed,
TIME TECH (Apr. 19, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/04/19/5-reasons-the-cispacybersecurity-bill-should-be-tossed/.
248. See Peckham, supra note 247.
249. See Riofrio, supra note 245 (“The bill creates a high level of immunity from
lawsuits for . . . private companies that share data.”).
250. See Gellman & Poitras, supra note 240. PRISM was first launched during
President George W. Bush’s administration. Id. After leaks of domestic surveillance
broke in 2007, Congress passed the Protect America Act and the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008, “which immunized private companies that cooperated voluntarily with
U.S. intelligence collection.” Id. At the same time, FISA courts began to issue
surveillance orders differently. Id. Under the Bush Administration, FISA judges no
longer had to find “probable cause that a particular ‘target’ and ‘facility’ were both
connected to terrorism or espionage.” Id. FISA court orders remain secret and largely
void of oversight, further complicating legal analysis. Id.
251. See generally Riofrio, supra note 245 (describing overly broad and vague terms
of CISPA, government and private industry access to information without express
authorization, and permissible information exchange between members of private
industry).
252. See, e.g., id. (explaining that without reciprocal permissions protecting
consumers, the public will never be able to find out if their information has been
collected and/or misused).
253. See generally id. (describing an ACLU spokesperson’s hope that CISPA will
encourage the Senate to come up with legislation that protects “the little guy” as much
as it does “big data”).
254. See id.
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VI. THE RISKS PRIVATE INDUSTRY POSES TO PRIVACY
Private industry’s unfettered collection, use, and sale of citizens’
personal data does pose risks. 255 One of these risks is that
information collected will be used for purposes other than those
expected by or disclosed to the consumer at the time of collection. 256
This privacy wrong has broad implications, because consumers
currently have no choice about the gathering of their own
information or its use.257 Many people unknowingly supply data
when a software app gathers it surreptitiously, or they supply
information through the Internet or their smartphone for
convenience.258 In the latter case, they do so because their choice is
either give information or be precluded from the use of a helpful or
popular application.259 Convenience often outweighs thoughts of
privacy, yet when the information given is used for a purpose
different from that of the application for which it was provided, the
consumer has been wronged.260
Some newer technologies remove consumer choice entirely from
the equation.261 Face recognition technology, for example, is used in
public and automatically captures one’s image without consent, and
in most cases, without knowledge that the data capture (and possible
subsequent identification) has even happened. 262 A consumer cannot
expect to have any semblance of control over their information and
their identification if they do not realize their image has been taken
or if the image was taken without consent.
Consumers are unaware of the quantity of information provided
to and gathered by third parties through smartphones and Internet
activity.263 For example, by combining a consumer’s likes and other
255. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 877, 878-84 (2003) (outlining both the “personal or private wrongs and public or
societal wrongs” associated with the invasion of privacy).
256. Id.
257. See id. at 881-82.
258. Nicole Perlroth and Nick Bilton, Mobile Apps Take Data Without Permission,
N.Y.
TIMES
BITS
BLOG
(Feb.
15,
2012,
9:05
AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/is/google-and-mobile-apps-take-data-bookswithout-permission?_r=0 (noting that “some of the most popular applications for the
iPhone, iPad and iPod . . . tak[e] users’ contacts and transmit[] it without their
knowledge”).
259. See id.
260. See Reidenberg, supra note 255, at 82.
261. See Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Facial Recognition Technology Sparks Renewed
Concerns,
REUTERS
(June
8,
2011,
5:26
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/08/uk-facebook-idUSLNE75701C20110608
(discussing reports of Facebook users that the company “enabled the facial recognition
option the last few days without giving users any notice”).
262. See id.
263. See Ian Truscott, When Mobile, Location, and Content Converge – I’ll Have a
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personal information with face recognition technology, a previously
anonymous person in public could be identified and then targeted
with specific marketing based upon the combination of that
identification with the already-collected personal information.264
A second risk—and the privacy issue probably felt by most
consumers—is the “lack of understanding” of how personal
information is collected and used by private industry. 265 Data
collection and use practices are “invisible to consumers.”266 Most
consumers are unaware of exactly how information is collected and
what is done with that information.267 The fear that one’s personal
information is “out there” without any control over who has it or
where it is going may be a harm that is less tangible than other
harms, such as physical economic loss, but it is just as real. 268
Consider how a consumer’s tracked preferences may impact search
results for information, not just for targeted product marketing. The
question of how collected personal data (i.e., tracked preferences)
may impact search results is a serious one. Could a conservative
individual’s political preferences (easily known from tracking his
online activity) result in his receiving a different Google search result
than a liberal individual who ran the same query? The answer is
“yes.”269
Consumers who do make an attempt to understand how their
information is used are often met with an impenetrable wall in the
form of a privacy policy.270 The FTC describes privacy policies as
being too long, too complex, and in “too many instances,

Guinness,
READWRITE
BLOG
(Dec.
26,
2011),
http://readwrite.com/2011/12/26/when_mobile_location_and_content_converge_-_ill_ha
(observing that “the general public doesn’t seem to mind” the “large-scale information
gathering”).
264. See id. Ian Truscott advances a plausible scenario that could result from such
data usage:
[I]f Smith & Wollensky in New York had a party of six just cancel their
reservation, and knew that five of my colleagues and I were at an industry
event around the corner, the combination of these data points (my location,
my likes, what I'm doing and at what time of day) could allow them to create
an offer that brings them a customer immediately.
Id.
265. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS: PRELIMINARY
FTC
STAFF
REPORT
25
(2010),
available
at
www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf.
266. Id. at 25-26.
267. Id.
268. Reidenberg, supra note 255, at 881.
269. See id. at 882 (discussing how the use of personal information leads to
solicitation).
270. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 265, at 19-20.
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incomprehensible to consumers.”271 There is an additional difficulty
when privacy policies are viewed on a mobile device. Smaller screen
size makes it unlikely that a consumer is going to scroll through
multiple screens to read the full policy.272 Even if they are
understood, privacy policies are used more for limiting the liability of
a company “than to inform consumers about how their [personal]
information will be used.”273 Additionally, privacy policies do not
allow any amount of choice.274 A consumer is essentially given the
option to use the service or not. 275 Whatever the service provides
usually trumps the fear of information collection. 276
There are some clear benefits to the consumer. Some consumers
desire and prefer targeted advertising. If given the choice, many
companies have found that consumers want to control and limit some
forms of information collection while allowing collection for
advertising in certain instances.277 Consumers may prefer targeted
advertising as opposed to an all or nothing approach to receiving
advertisements because it means more efficient advertising and less
of a barrage of unwanted solicitations. 278
This is important to incorporate in legislation because many
privacy guidelines, including “Do Not Track,” have been described as
bad for business and the Internet. Mike Zaneis, the Interactive
Advertising Bureau’s senior vice president and general counsel for
public policy, argues that mechanisms like “Do Not Track could affect
80 percent of web ads” and eventually “forc[e] free content sites to
charge subscription fees.”279
But are these claims overblown? Do Not Track can still sell
“‘non-targeted’ ads”280 or “contextual ads,”281 as opposed to targeted
advertising that uses cookies to track an Internet user’s history.282
271. Id. at 19.
272. Id. at 70.
273. Id. at 19.
274. See id. (noting that “while many companies disclose their practices, a smaller
number actually offer consumers the ability to control these practices”).
275. See id. at 19-20 (“[C]onsumers face a substantial burden in reading and
understanding privacy policies and exercising the limited choices offered to them.”).
276. Id. at ii.
277. Id. at 68.
278. See id. at ii.
279. Cohn, supra note 192.
280. Examples of non-targeted ad include random advertisements such as “Click to
win an iPad!” See id.
281. Advertisements based on a company’s own content as opposed to the content of
its users’ cookies are considered contextual ads. Id.
282. There may be other ways to use cookies without tracking. Jonathan Mayer and
Subodh Iyengar may have created an approach that allows for targeted advertising
without tracking. Jonathan Mayer & Subodh Iyengar, Tracking Not Required:
Behavioral Targeting, 33 BITS OF ENTROPY (June 11, 2012, 2:42 PM),
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Still, there may be even less harm to private industry with greater
choice options for consumers. This should play an important role in
legislation so that business is not stifled while still ensuring
consumers are protected.
Privacy legislation that regulates data retention and limits data
use is more likely to create trust between industries and their
consumers. An auditing mechanism would reinforce this trust and
perhaps lead more consumers to employ choice and allow desired
types of targeted advertising. FTC studies support the idea that
consumer privacy legislation does not have to be an all-or-nothing
proposition adverse to private industry. Reports and examples 283
from the European Union (EU) prove it is possible to grant consumer
privacy protections without crippling private industry.
A. Current Voluntary Guidelines
The United States lacks any meaningful legislation to regulate
and/or protect how private industry collects, uses, and sells the
personal information it obtains, often surreptitiously.284 In the face of
an increasing number of technologies that allow for the dragnet
collection of consumers’ personal information, the EU has been more
aggressive in its protection of personal information and data,
enacting the Data Protection Directive as early as 1995. 285
http://33bits.org/2012/06/11/tracking-not-required-behavioral-targeting/.
283. The EU passed the “Cookie Law” with varying degrees of compliance by EU
member states. Cookie Law Frequently Asked Questions, THE COOKIE COLLECTIVE,
http://www.cookielaw.org/faq.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2013). In the United Kingdom,
the Cookie Law went into effect in 2011 with a one-year grace period. Id. The law
requires websites to provide notice that they are using cookies and obtain user consent
to do so. Id. Some critics have said implementation of the Cookie Law has resulted in a
diminished user experience without increasing privacy. Id. Some scholars argue that
this is a problem with the implementation of the law rather than with the concept. The
United States has an opportunity and should seize upon it to learn what type of
implementation works and what has failed. One mechanism to give users control over
cookies is “Optanon.” Optanon Privacy Preference Center, THE COOKIE COLLECTIVE,
http://www.cookielaw.org/optanon.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2013). Through Optanon,
whenever a user visits a website, a small bar is opened at the top or bottom of the page
informing the user that the website uses cookies and including a link for more
information. Id. A tool bar can also be used to control what types of cookies are
implemented while a user is on that website. Id. The tool bar includes a menu of five
choices including an overview about controlling one’s privacy and then four choices
that directly allow the user to determine which cookies to allow. Id. “Strictly Necessary
Cookies,” for example, when clicked, explain what they do and are automatically on to
ensure the website functions. Id. On the other extreme are “targeting cookies.” Id.
These cookies are briefly described as including relevant information about targeted
advertising and also include an option to allow or disable those particular cookies. Id.
284. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text and Part V.B.
285. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L28131)
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Although legislatively, the United States has failed to protect
consumer information, there have been some moves in the United
States towards providing personal data and privacy protections. 286
For instance, the FTC issued voluntary guidelines for commercial use
of face recognition technologies, and some marketing industries have
issued codes of conduct as a form of self-imposed regulation.287 The
FTC has issued a report urging consumer privacy online, the most
notable portion of which is its “Do Not Track” guidelines. 288 These
FTC guidelines illustrate what rapidly advancing surveillance and
tracking technology is capable of and how to implement use of the
same technologies with privacy in mind.289 While a useful theoretical
starting point, the FTC guidelines lack teeth. They do not provide an
enforcement mechanism, and companies that have willingly imposed
self-regulation measures are only subject to FTC enforcement if they
break their own adopted code of conduct.290 These guidelines and
codes of conduct do not do nearly enough to protect Americans.
Because the FTC’s Do Not Track proposal and face recognition
technology guidelines are sources to consider when adopting future
legislation, they bear closer analysis.
1. FTC Do Not Track Guidelines
A preliminary 2010 and updated 2012 FTC Report entitled
Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change supports a
Do Not Track approach.291 The FTC suggests that Do Not Track be
implemented through a cookie or a setting on a user’s Internet
browser that would allow the consumer choice in (1) whether to allow
Internet websites to track them and (2) whether to receive targeted
advertising.292
Some companies and browsers already offer some form of a Do
Not Track mechanism.293 Current Do Not Track programs, however,
have not been adopted industry-wide, and many consumers are
unaware such programs exist. 294 Moreover, the Do Not Track choices
being offered to consumers are often unclear in explaining the scope

[hereinafter Council Directive 95/46/EC].
286. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 192, at 4-5 (prefacing
recommendations with a review of attempts to enact consumer privacy laws and
voluntary private sector adoption of Do Not Track standards).
287. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 265, at 45-48.
288. See id. at 66-67.
289. See id. at 39-40.
290. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 192, at 10 n.47.
291. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 265, at vi-vii; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note
192, at v.
292. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 265, at vii.
293. Id. at 63-64.
294. Id. at 25, 33, 43, 64-67.
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of the tracking that actually occurs and the limitations of current,
voluntary, and self-regulated Do Not Track mechanisms.295 Do Not
Track is a mechanism that can be legislated in language that is nontechnology specific. Such legislation should protect an individual’s
right to not be tracked in his or her online activities, regardless of the
technology through which an individual is engaging in online activity
and regardless of what technologies are or become available to track
the individuals’ online activity.296 Moreover, any Do Not Track
legislation should address uniformity, public awareness, and
consumer choice in tracking.297
2. The FTC Face Recognition Technology Guidelines
As previously discussed, face recognition technology has opened
a new platform for companies to market their products. The FTC has
correctly identified the privacy implications of using face recognition
technology.298 One of the main dangers to privacy by face recognition
technology is the ability to identify previously anonymous people by
matching anonymous images with prior images in which that person
had been identified. With an exception,299 the use of face recognition
technology for commercial purposes is unregulated. Because face
recognition technology use has expanded significantly in the past
decade,300 it is important to pass privacy legislation that protects
biometric identifiers (such as one’s facial biometrics) in language
independent of specific biometric identification technologies.
Biometric identification technology is evolving so rapidly that any
law passed with language or application specific to a particular
biometric identification technology (as opposed to protecting the
biometric information itself) will be obsolete within months.
Consider currently used or planned face recognition uses:
Companies such as Kraft and Adidas plan to use in-store digital
signs equipped with face recognition cameras to target ads
specifically tailored for the customer walking near the sign. 301 This
raises serious privacy concerns. The face recognition cameras will
295. Id. at 64-65.
296. Id. at iii.
297. Id. at 70, E-6-7.
298. Id. at 14-16.
299. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008) (passing the Biometric Information Privacy
Act); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (West 2009) (requiring notice and consent
to use biometric identifiers for a commercial purpose).
300. This is well demonstrated by the number of patents issued by the U.S. Patent
office. In the twenty-five years between 1970 and 1995, the Office issued fewer than
ten patents for facial recognition technology. Donohue, supra note 150, at 410.
Between 1995 and 2000 the number of patents jumped to twenty. Id. Between 2001
and 2011, the number of patents skyrocketed to 633 patents relating to facial
recognition technology. Id.
301. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 291, at 5 n.20.

2013]

PARALLEL PRIVACY STANDARDS

1081

identify the age and demographics of the person to target an ad, but
what if the camera is used to identify the individual as opposed to the
demographic group? Current face recognition technology now makes
the identification of the individual possible.302 How would notice be
provided? Can the sign be avoided if desired by the customer? Is the
image taken retained and stored by the company or sold to a third
party?
Such practices and scenarios are currently unregulated by
federal legislation or through mandatory guidelines. 303 While some
companies do self-regulate and have in place privacy policies that
consider consumer concerns, there is no mechanism to ensure that
privacy policy changes are approved by or acceptable to consumers,
or that private industry is required to provide consumers with an
opt-in or opt-out choice.304
Companies that do have aggressive consumer-focused privacy
features can market themselves as the privacy friendly company, but
such self-imposed acts do nothing to set standards for the industry as
a whole, nor does it mean that a company is actually applying
adequate consumer privacy protections.
In its 2012 report, the FTC sums the problem up well:
“[C]onsumers face a landscape of virtually ubiquitous collection of
their data.”305 And the FTC makes an important point to consider
when legislating to protect consumer data: “Whether such collection
occurs online or offline does not alter the consumer’s privacy interest
in his or her data.”306 In the FTC’s report and in other industry and
privacy advocate reports, there are similarly proposed privacy
protection measures.307 While some suggestions are specific as to a
particular type of web or mobile applications or technology, the
proposals all include instituting “privacy by design,” which entails:
data security measures, reasonable retention and storage practices,
clear
notice
and
transparency,
simplified
choices,
and
accountability.308 The practices proposed and identified by the FTC
should be incorporated into legislation in such a way as to apply to
data collected off and online.

302. Id. at 4.
303. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 265, at 19-20 (describing the limitations of
existing legislation).
304. Id. at 70-72, 76-77 (recommending that such regulations come into existence).
305. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 192, at 19-20.
306. Id. at 18.
307. Id.
308. Privacy By Design means companies should “build in privacy at every stage of
product development.” Id. at i. When companies are designing products, applications,
or methods to collect personal information, they should consider initially how to make
their practices transparent and give greater choice to consumers. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
supra note 291, at ii-iii.

1082

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:4

3. The European Union Model
The EU has the most comprehensive set of principles pertaining
to the protection of personal data. 309 The 1995 Data Protection
Directive310 focuses on the protection of data that is processed, used,
or exchanged “by automated means,” such as “a computer database of
customers.”311 The principles encompassed in the EU Directive
include: notice to the subjects whose data is collected; 312 notice about
the purpose for which the data is collected; 313 the data should be used
for that limited purpose only;314 the personal data should not be
disclosed to third parties without consent from the subjects whose
data is collected;315 collected personal data should be kept secure; 316
the identities of the entities collecting data should be disclosed to the
subject of collection;317 subjects should be granted access to the
information as a way to control their information and ensure
accuracy;318 and subjects should have redress in order to hold
collectors accountable.319
Eighteen years after its passing, the EU is working to revise the
Directive.320 The European Commission says the proposal is meant to
give users greater control of their data and to cut costs for
businesses.321 The proposal, due out in 2014, focuses on creating a
single set of rules and alleviating unnecessary administrative
requirements; it also gives greater enforcement power to independent
data protection authorities.322
The EU’s new proposed standards have generated some
criticism. One version of the proposal includes the “right to be
309. Personal data is defined as “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number
or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic,
cultural or social identity.” Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 285, at art. 2(a).
310. Id. at 31.
311. Protection
of
Personal
Data,
EUROPA,
(Feb.
1,
2011),
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/information_society/data_protection/l14012_en
.htm.
312. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 285, at ch. II, § IV, art. 10.
313. Id. at ch. II, § IV, art 10(b).
314. Id. at ch. II, § I, art. 6(b).
315. Id. at ch. II, § III, art. 8(d).
316. Id. at ch. II, § I, art. 6(1)(c).
317. Id. at ch. II, § IV, art. 10(a).
318. Id. at ch. II, § IV, art. 12(b).
319. Id. at ch. II, §§ VII, art. 14(b); IV, art. 23(1).
320. Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data Protection Rules to
Increase Users’ Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses, EUROPA, (Jan.
25, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm?locale=en.
321. Id.
322. Id.
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forgotten.”323 The right to be forgotten would make it mandatory for
social media companies to delete all information previously collected
on a user upon the user’s request.324 This would enable the user a
chance to wipe the slate clean. Such provisions are consistent with
the goal of the revisions, which is largely a response to social media
companies’ unfettered gathering and retaining vast quantities of
intimate user data, including messages, photos, likes and dislikes,
friends, preferences, et cetera.325 Critics, however, contend that the
right to be forgotten proposal will create a “new layer of regulation
for [a large number] of businesses that have nothing to do with social
media.”326 Another proposed requirement is that businesses ask for
and obtain “explicit prior consent” from consumers before engaging in
targeted advertising.327
The Directive is meant to protect the right to privacy, which is
recognized in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.328 The United States has much to learn from the EU’s
experience in implementing privacy legislation.329 Unlike the
problem of disparate protections amongst EU member states, the
United States has the benefit of being able to set the floor for privacy
legislation and allow states to, at a minimum, meet that floor or
implement greater privacy protections.330 Additionally, the United
States can learn from the successes and failures of the independent
data protection authorities when considering how much enforcement

323. Sally Annereau, Are New Data Protection Proposals for a Right to Be Forgotten
Workable?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2013, 8:24 AM), available at,
http://www.theguardian/media-network/media-network-blog/2013/apr/22/dataprotection-right-to-forgotten.
324. Id.
325. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 285, at ch. I, art. 1.
326. Kevin J. O’Brien, Firms Brace for New European Data Privacy Law, N.Y.
TIMES,
May
14,
2013,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/technology/firms-brace-for-new-european-dataprivacy-law.html.
327. Id.
328. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, Sept. 3, 1953,
www.echr.coe.into/Documents/Convention_ENG./pdf.
329. See Facial Recognition & Privacy: An EU-US Perspective, CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY
AND
TECHNOLOGY
6-7
(Oct.
8,
2012),
https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT_facial_recog.pdf (discussing how EU member states
have enacted a “patchwork of regulations for image-data processing” and stating that
there is “an uncertain regulatory environment for facial recognition” technology
because the Directive “merely sets high-level principles for [the technology]”).
330. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that “the Laws of the United States . . .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . anything in the . . . Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding”); Facial Recognition & Privacy, supra note 329, at 10
(noting that “the most sensible solution is setting a floor of privacy protections, with
one comprehensive framework”).

1084

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:4

power to give a similar oversight body. 331
B. Legislative Solutions
As hopefully this Article has demonstrated thus far, despite our
country and our courts’ unique roles in developing and recognizing
the modern concept of an individual’s inalienable right to privacy, the
United States continues to lack a legislative framework to adequately
protect its citizens’ personal data from the extraordinary advances in
technology that permit government and private industry’s
surreptitious, non-intrusive acquisition of that data.332
In theory, the Fourth Amendment and Title III should provide
citizens protection from the government’s warrantless electronic
surveillance and collection of our personal data; but as this Article
has outlined, rapid advances in technology and the NSA’s
warrantless surveillance programs call the efficacy of the Fourth
Amendment and wiretapping laws’ protections into question. 333
Moreover, even though some aspects of Title III, including the ECPA
and the SCA, apply to private individuals and private industry, the
Fourth Amendment and the federal electronic surveillance scheme do
nothing to protect citizens from the pervasive information collected
by private industry.334
But the United States has the ability to correct these problems.
We have the benefit of model legislation in the EU privacy directive,
and we can learn from the redundancies and administrative burdens
that businesses in the EU have faced.335 Thus, we will be able to
implement a streamlined form of legislation that protects consumers
while having a minimal prohibitive effect on business.336 Moreover,
federal regulators at the FTC and many advertisers support the
implementation of privacy legislation that protects both the personal
information of consumers while balancing the needs of businesses
and ensuring continued innovation.337 By creating uniform
standards, legislation could ultimately save businesses money.
What is the proper framework for a legislative solution? For
reasons discussed above, a legislative framework that relies upon
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not ideal for potential
legislation.338 Nor is legislation that is specifically geared towards
331. See Facial Recognition & Privacy, supra note 330, at 11-13.
332. See discussion supra Part II-VI.A.
333. See discussion supra Part II.A; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
334. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006).
335. See discussion supra Part VI.B.
336. See supra notes 308-319.
337. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 265 (discussing ways in which
this balance may be met).
338. For instance, the FTC Guidelines consider possible uses of facial recognition
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one particular technology.339 In fact, one consistent failing in privacy
legislation has been that legislation is drafted in technology-specific
terms or technology-specific application; given the pace of
advancements in technology, this has resulted in outdated and
inapplicable portions of law.340 Rather, legislation should focus on
protecting types or categories of data. This would foster new
technology designs to adapt to legislative protections as opposed to
legislation slowly and inconsistently adapting to new technology. It
will create greater uniformity and result in clearer standards for
private industry to follow because the way the information is
collected is not at issue; rather, the type and breadth of the
information collected is protected.
The most important aspect of any legislation designed to protect
citizens’ privacy, however, is that it be applicable in parallel ways
both to private industry and to government. The disparate ability of
private industry to collect vast quantities of data versus the

technology and address how the FTC Guidelines would apply to these possible
scenarios. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 291. In one scenario involving digital signs
equipped with facial recognition technology, the FTC suggests that notice should be
given because “the use of these technologies within digital signs is not currently
consistent with reasonable consumer expectations.” Id. at 14-15. This is precisely the
type of standard however, that should be avoided when implementing legislation.
Although non-binding, the FTC’s suggestion that notice is only required when
consumers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, suggests that once this
technology is pervasive, notice will no longer be required because consumers will know
that signs are equipped with facial recognition software. But the FTC’s reliance upon
the reasonable expectation of privacy test is problematic. As Justices Sotomayor and
Alito have suggested, the reasonable expectation of privacy standard needs to be
reevaluated. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
and Alito, J., concurring).
339. See Facial Recognition & Privacy, supra note 330, at 1 (acknowledging the
wide variety of technology that may result in abuses and the need for a comprehensive
framework to combat privacy invasion).
340. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) for example, was an
extension of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2013, S. REP. NO.
113-14, at 2 (stating that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act amended the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act). When Title III was enacted, computers,
email and other technologies were not available. By 1986, though, such technologies
were becoming widespread, which lead to new protections under ECPA to protect
“electronic communications” and stored wire communications among other updates.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1986). ECPA is
considered a good law; however, over a quarter of a century later ECPA is overdue for
an update once again. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy and Sen.
Mike Lee introduced the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of
2013 to update the law to reflect “new privacy concerns and new technological
realities.” Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Lee Introduce Legislation to Update
Electronic
Communications
Privacy
Act
(Mar.
19,
2013),
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-lee-introduce-legislation-to-update-electroniccommunications-privacy-act.
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government’s ability to collect the same data has deleterious
consequences on several fronts. On the one hand, our privacy is not
meaningfully protected because private industry is able to collect,
retain and sell our intimate personal data. On the other, the
government is hamstrung in its abilities legally to monitor activities
in a way that does not chill First Amendment rights or violate the
Fourth Amendment.341 And regardless, the NSA surveillance leaks
demonstrate that if private industry is lawfully collecting the data,
the federal government will find ways to access the data. 342
1. Proposal for Legislation
The following is a rough framework for proposed legislation to
protect an individual’s right to privacy in the modern era; this
legislation would be applicable in the same or a parallel fashion to
private industry and to government.343
a. Transparency
Transparency is a significant obstacle to consumer privacy rights
because consumers are simply unaware of or uninterested in
understanding what private industry is capable of. 344 Beyond seeing
targeted ads on their computers or receiving targeted marketing
information, there is not enough understanding of where, when, and
how companies collect consumer information.345 Transparency is
essential to furthering the needs and rights of consumers.
Strong legislation must include a requirement for companies
collecting consumer information to be clear and concise about who is
collecting the information, what information is collected, how that
information is collected, the purpose for which data is used, whom
the data is shared with, with what information the collected data is
combined, how the company secures data, how long the data is
retained, choices consumers have with regard to that data, how to
correct that data, and a company contact for problems and
341. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
342. Madrigal, supra note 2.
343. The framework is the result of this Author’s almost two decades of researching,
writing, practicing law, and teaching about privacy, federal and state wiretapping and
privacy laws, as well as from reviewing and considering other sources, including the
EU Data Protection Directive, FTC Guidelines, and proposed drone legislation. In
addition, my thoughts have been shaped over the years by the opportunity to work
with so many brilliant, amazing privacy scholars through the yearly Privacy Law
Scholar’s Conference, through working with many fine panelists at various law school
events, and the Professors at The Catholic University of America, especially Clifford S.
Fishman, and Mary Leary, among others.
344. DIGITAL SIGNAGE FEDERATION, supra note 291, at 4-6 (explaining the need for
privacy policies and notice for the sake of transparency).
345. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 291, at iii (demonstrating how information
can be gathered on an individual without his or her knowledge).
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feedback.346 This information should be given by something other
than a privacy policy. This should be written to apply in both online
scenarios as well as offline scenarios. For example, if a kiosk or sign
is placed in a public area and uses facial recognition technology,
consumers should be able to easily avoid the area, receive multiple
forms of notice prior to falling within the sign’s purview, and have
the option to access further information explaining the previously
required material.347 A generic form of notice, such as “[t]hese
premises are under video monitoring” would not comply because it
fails to provide enough transparency.348
b. Storage and Data Retention
Data should not be stored or retained once the initial purpose for
which that data was collected becomes obsolete.349 This provision
may include an exception if the company receives informed consent
from the consumer whose image or information is being retained. 350
Furthermore, companies should not only explain their storage and
retention policies, but ensure those policies are reasonable. 351
Legislation must include a time limit for when companies must
dispose of stored information, unless the company demonstrates that
the retention of such information continues to serve its initial
purpose.352
c. Choice
Legislation must require companies to give consumers a choice
as to what types of advertising to receive. More importantly,
legislation must require that companies provide consumers a
meaningful choice as to how and to what extent their information is
collected and used. As previously discussed, consumer behavior
suggests that consumers want granular or delineated choices as
opposed to an all or nothing form of information collection. 353 The EU
has a similar provision in place and several member states have
346. DIGITAL SIGNAGE PRIVACY STANDARDS, supra note 291, at 4.
347. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 291, at 15.
348. DIGITAL SIGNAGE PRIVACY STANDARDS, supra note 291, at 6.
349. In the digital sign equipped with facial recognition technology this would mean
that the image would not be stored once the consumer has received the targeted
advertisement. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 291, at 14.
350. Id. at 12.
351. See id. at 11.
352. See id. at 11 (stating that a company “should implement a specified retention
period and dispose of stored images once they are no longer necessary for the purpose
for which they were collected”).
352. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 265, at ii (discussing the differences in
consumer opinions on collection of certain categories of information).
353. See id. at ii (discussing the differences in consumer opinions on collection of
certain categories of information).
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already instituted choice mechanisms.354 Some methods of
implementation have been more successful than others. Regardless,
U.S. legislation should require that consumers are given choices and
companies can look to EU companies as to how this can be most
successfully implemented.
d. Consent
Consent is inextricably connected with notice and choice. For
instance, a company may not need to obtain consent to collect a
consumer’s contact and credit card information following a purchase
or for first party marketing.355 Amazon.com, for example,
recommends products based on prior purchases and offline retailers
may provide coupons for previously purchased merchandise.356
Websites and retailers using first party marketing, however, should
receive consent if that data is shared with a third party or affiliate. 357
The type of consent required should be based on the type of
information sought to be collected and used. The Digital Signage
Federation (DSF) partnered with the Center for Democracy and
Technology to create categories based on how information is
collected, what type of information is collected and what is done with
that information.358 Based on the category the type of collection falls
within, the DSF determines whether opt-in or opt-out consent is
required.359 While this particular model is not necessarily what
354. EUROPA, supra note 312, at 2 (noting the “right to object” to data collection and
storage).
355. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 265, at 54.
356. See generally Amazon, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Nov. 26, 2013).
357. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 265, at 55.
358. DIGITAL SIGNAGE PRIVACY STANDARDS, supra note 291, at 6-7. “Level I:
Audience counting. Information related to consumers is gathered on an aggregate
basis, but are not used for tailoring advertisements in real time (i.e., as the consumer
walks by the sign). No retained information, including images, links to individuals or
their property.” Example: Facial recognition systems that only track gazes or record
passerby demographics, but do not tore facial images or unique biometric data points.
The advertisements are not tailored to demographics in real time. “Level II: Audience
targeting. Information related to consumers is collected on an aggregate basis and is
used for tailoring contextual advertisements to individuals in real time. No retained
information, including images, links to individuals or their property.” Example: Facial
recognition systems that record passerby demographics and contextualize ads
accordingly as the consumer walks by. “Level III: Audience identification and/or
profiling. Information related to consumers is collected on an individual basis,
regardless of whether or when the information is used to tailor advertisements.
Information is retained that links to individual identity, unique travel or purchase
patterns, or an individual’s property (such as a mobile phone). Example: combining a
digital signage system with social networking, RFID tracking, mobile marketing.
Example: combining a digital signage system with credit card receipts, online
browsing habits, purchases, or third party marketing data.
DIGITAL SIGNAGE PRIVACY STANDARDS, supra note 291, at 7.
359. Id. at 7. The DSF specifies that: “Levels I and II should implement opt out
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should be adopted, a similar type of framework may be appropriate
to determine what type of consent is required. Consent should be
revocable at any time and a mechanism should be in place so that
this can easily and efficiently be done.
e. Data Security
The FTC already has some enforcement power under Section 5 of
the FTC Act. Since 2001, the FTC has brought actions in thirty-six
cases against businesses that have failed to appropriately protect
consumers’ personal information. 360 Companies such as Google and
Twitter have already responded to such actions by increasing data
security by encryption of consumer communication and data. 361
However, legislation applicable to online providers as well as those in
public using facial recognition and other technologies is required.
Legislation must require companies to take reasonable measures to
protect collected data from hacking and security breaches. Failure to
do so should result in penalties for the companies. What is
reasonable could be determined based on current industry standards.
f. Auditing/Oversight
Enforcement is necessary to ensure that companies are in
compliance with legislation. The EU Directive for example, requires
each member state to create an independent supervisory board or
authority to oversee the implementation of the privacy directive as
well as enforce and bring suits against companies found to be in
violation of the Directive. 362 For purposes of U.S. legislation, there
should be a body363 charged with the investigation or auditing of
private industry as well as the power to enforce any violations of the
requisite statute. In the United States, the FTC could be charged
with the investigation and there could be an FTC-based or
independent government enforcement body against companies that
violate privacy legislation. But providing a civil remedy for statutory

consent. At minimum, opt-out consent can be accomplished via notice. Notifying
consumers that a particular signage unit collects information gives consumers the
opportunity to avoid that signage unit.
Level III requires opt-in consent, which should be issued after the consumer has the
opportunity to examine the applicable privacy policy.” Id.
360. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 192, at 24.
361. Id. at 25-26.
362. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 285, at ch. VI, art. 28.
363. This could be the FTC. The FTC is already granted enforcement power over a
variety of consumer protection statutes such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
Truth-in-Lending Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act among several others. A Brief
Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement
Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm (last visited Nov.
3, 2013).
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violations is also necessary.364 It is frequently American civil trial
attorneys who most aggressively protect individual privacy rights. 365
Our civil trial attorneys have a demonstrated record of using the
existing legal system to help enforce statutory provisions that protect
individuals, consumers, and businesses. 366 One such example of this
is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which permits civil actions to
be brought when a person accesses a protected computer without
authorization or in excess of authorization. 367 Using the CFAA’s
statutorily provided civil cause of action, trial attorneys are able to
protect data and intellectual property in new ways. 368
g. Damages/Penalty
Legislation must provide a criminal violation and a civil cause of
action or civil remedy to any individual who has been damaged under
the statute. In addition to the FTC or other body charged with
investigating and enforcing the statute, courts should have the
means to provide injunctive relief and place other fines or penalties
for violations of the statute. For example, the proposal for revisions
to the EU Directive includes a provision for graduated fines. 369
Another option may be to impose graduated fines, but have those
fines be proportionate to the size and profit of the business that
committed the violation. Such a system may create the desired
deterrent effect without crippling smaller businesses with lower
profits, while also providing a meaningful fine to companies with
immense profits. Permitting a civil cause of action for violation of the
statute, if certain conditions are met, would allow trial attorneys to
ensure businesses and individuals comply with statutory provisions
364. See Kristin M. Beasley, Up-Skirt and Other Dirt: Why Cell Phone Cameras and
Other Technologies Require a New Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy in Public
Places, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 69, 92 (2006) (“Civil suits are necessary because vindication of
an individual’s right to personal privacy benefits a society as a whole by protecting all
citizens’ expectations of personal privacy from erosion.”).
365. See, e.g., id. at 93 (“[C]ivil plaintiffs may be more motivated than criminal
prosecutors, for whom this type of behavior may seem relatively harmless . . . .”).
366. See id. at 92-93 (“If courts become accustomed to extending the right to
personal privacy into public areas in circumstances in which a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in criminal suits, victims may have a better chance at recovery
in a civil suit for invasion of privacy . . . . Therefore, under the private attorney general
theory, individual plaintiffs should be encouraged to bring civil suits to protect
important rights that traditional law enforcement may be unable to adequately
protect.”).
367. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (g) (2006).
368. Id.
369. Judy P. Schmitt & Florian Stahl, How the Proposed EU Data Protection
Regulation is Creating a Ripple Effect Worldwide, PRIVACY ASSOCIATION.ORG (Oct. 11,
2012),
https://www.privacyassociation.org/media/presentations/A12_EU_DP_Regulation_PPT
.pdf.
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to protect consumers or face a civil lawsuit.
h. An Individual’s Access to Data
The EU Directive includes the right of individuals to access the
information that has been collected about them and to have some
amount of measurable control over it.370 The purpose is to ensure
accuracy of the data.371 There have been similar suggestions for U.S.
legislation. Consumer access to collected data does have many
benefits. While it improves transparency of collection practices, it
also creates issues with data security and may require companies to
create consumer profiles when they do not already do so. These
issues may bring prohibitive costs to companies.372 The FTC suggests
that one option is a “sliding scale approach”373 in which consumer
access would be proportionate to the “intended use and sensitivity of
the information.”374 Such a provision may also be applicable to
certain formats, such as social media sites. In the context of social
media for example, the user creates and in theory controls his or her
profile. For that reason, the user should have greater access and
control of that information and how it is used.
i. Other Considerations: Use, Protection, and Education
The creation of parallel standards to govern private industry and
government’s collection, retention, and use of personal data would
address the current problem of government use. The recent
“Prism”375 revelations exemplify why Congress should pass
legislation that provides for “government use” in compliance with the
Fourth Amendment and other statutory law before it can access
personal information obtained by private companies. Congressional
legislation could provide for exceptions for national security or
monitoring of foreign nationals. The EU Directive, for example,
provides exceptions to the Directive in cases of national security and
the “prevention . . . of criminal offences.”376
370. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 285, at ch. II, § IV, art. 10.
371. Id. at ch. II, § I, art. 6(d).
372. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 265, at 73-74.
373. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 192, at 29.
374. Id. at 29-30.
375. Prism is a surveillance program operated by the NSA under the supervision of
the FISA court. Stephen Braun et al, Secret to Prism Program: Even Bigger Data
Seizures,
THE
ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
(June
15,
2013,
2:53
PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/secret-prism-success-even-bigger-data-seizure.
The
Associated Press reports that Prism is actually a small part of a much more expansive
eavesdropping program. Id.
376. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 285, at ch. II, §VI, art. 13(d). The EU
standard, however, may provide too few limitations on government. U.S. legislation
should include some meaningful limitations on the Government’s collection power and
provide more transparency about the government’s use of data “collected by private
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Legislation should also include a provision devoted to protecting
certain vulnerable groups, such as children. The proposed revisions
to the current EU Directive include a provision that requires consent
given by a child’s parent or guardian to use data collected from
children under the age of thirteen.377 Similar provisions should be
considered in U.S. legislation, including the protection of children
and other vulnerable parties, such as those with certain disabilities
or diminished mental capacity.
Finally, there should be a provision encouraging further
consumer education. Many companies have already undertaken
efforts to explain what is done with consumer data. 378 Such programs
should be expanded to educate consumers so individuals can make an
informed decision on how much personal information to divulge to
private companies.
2.

Recent Events Demonstrate Why Parallel Standards
Must Be Part of Legislation

Facebook recently announced changes to its user and privacy
policies under the guise of clarifying its practices; however, upon
closer inspection, it was astonishing to read what the privacy policy
changes were actually about. According to The New York Times,
Facebook’s new provisions “essentially give the company blanket
permission to use the name, photo and other personal content of its
users in advertising or sponsored content.”379 Also troubling, the
changes permit Facebook to “automatically assumes that the parents
of teenagers using the service have given permission for their names
and images to be used in Facebook advertising.” 380 And the changes
document Facebook’s aggressive expansion of its use of face
recognition technology.381
As a result of continued reliance on third-party doctrine and the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard, it has been unclear what,
if any, protections our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would
afford an individual’s Facebook activities from private industry via
common law privacy protections and from government snooping.
Court holdings are inconsistent. 382 In their concurrences in United
industry.”
377. Schmitt & Stahl, supra note 369.
378. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 192, at 78.
379. Vindu Goel & Edward Wyatt, Facebook Privacy Change Is Subject of FTC
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, at B1.
380. Id.
381. Steve Henn, Facebook’s Latest Privacy Changes: Tag, You’re You, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO
(Aug.
30,
2013,
4:03
PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/08/30/217281470/facebooks-latestprivacy-changes-tag-youre-you.
382. Compare United States v. Meregildo, 883 F.Supp.2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
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States v. Jones, we see Justices Alito and Sotomayor grapple with
this very problem.383 But a recent Ninth Circuit ruling demonstrates
that some courts are unwilling to accept private industry’s
arguments that their data collection, use and sale activities are not
constrained in some fashion. In this recent case, it is alleged that
Google’s “Street View” mapping vehicles, in addition to taking
photographs, “secretly collected e-mail, passwords, images and other
personal information from unencrypted home computer networks.” 384
Google’s activities led to a handful of lawsuits by U.S. citizens
who argued that Google had violated their privacy and had engaged
in illegal wiretapping. These cases were ultimately consolidated in
Joffe v. Google.385 At trial, Google moved to dismiss, arguing that the
Wi-Fi communications its Street View vehicles captured were
“readily accessible to the general public,” and therefore the Wiretap
Act’s exemption for electronic communication that “is readily
accessible to the general public” exempted Google’s activities and
required dismissal.386 The federal district trial court rejected Google’s
argument, permitting plaintiffs to proceed. Google appealed to the
Ninth Circuit and on September 10, 2013, a Ninth Circuit panel held
that the Wi-Fi network data collected by Google was not a “radio
communication” under the Wiretap Act, and thus was not by
definition readily accessible to the general public.387 The panel also
held that data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is not readily
accessible to the general public under the ordinary meaning of the
phrase as it is used in Section 2511(2)(g)(i) of the Wiretap Act.388
Challenges to Google’s data collection practices have not ended
(denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained when cooberating witness
showed police defendant’s Facebook profile because, although he believed law
enforcement would not have access, defendant “had no justifiable expectation that his
‘friends’ would keep his profile private”) with Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp.
Service Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369 (D.N.J. 2012) (finding that the plaintiff in the case
“may” have a reasonable expectation of privacy in her Facebook posts based upon her
privacy settings and that her employer’s viewing of those posts may have constituted a
common law invasion of privacy).
383. 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (opining that in a “digital
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks . . . . information voluntarily
disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose” may nevertheless be
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection); id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting
that the expectation of privacy test “rests on the assumption that th[e] hypothetical
reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations[,] [b]ut
that technology can change these expectations”).
384. David Streitfeld, Court Says Privacy Case Can Proceed vs. Google, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2013, at B1.
385. Joffee v. Google, Inc., No. 11-17483, 2013 WL 4793247 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2013).
386. Id. at 1081.
387. Joffee, 2013 WL 4793247, at *5.
388. Id.
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with the Street View litigation. In the case of In Re Google Inc. Gmail
Litigation, which involves allegations that Google’s email practices
violate the federal wiretap act and privacy laws, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California ruled on April 1,
2013, that Google’s policies may violate the federal wiretap act. 389
Google routinely intercepts, reads, and acquires the contents of email
users for advertising purposes. 390 A few months later, Judge Koh
found this practice problematic. 391 “[T]he court finds that it cannot
conclude that any party—Gmail users or non-Gmail users—has
consented to Google’s reading of e-mail for the purposes of creating
user profiles or providing targeted advertising.” 392 Judge Koh further
stated, “Google has cited no case that stands for the proposition that
users who send emails impliedly consent to interceptions and use of
their communications by . . . other than the intended recipient of the
email.”393
VII. CONCLUSION
As this Article has attempted to demonstrate, emerging
technologies and a legislative void have combined to permit private
industry to surreptitiously collect, retain, use, and sell staggering
quantities of intimate, personal, individual data. Our constitutional
and jurisprudential privacy protections and standards (e.g., the
third-party doctrine and the reasonable expectation of privacy test)
were developed long before the advent of the Internet and afford
little functional protection from private industry’s activities. In turn,
the fact that the data has been collected and stored makes it far more
easily accessible to government.
Unless and until legislation is passed that preserves and protects
an individual’s privacy in the same way from private industry and
from government’s ability to collect, retain, and use such information,
our courts will continue to face legal conundrums, and all concepts of
privacy will be functionally eroded. By regulating what data can be
collected, how it can be collected, what can be done with it once it is
collected, and permitting an individual the right to know what has
been collected, and by applying these regulations equally to private
industry and government, we can preserve our fundamental concepts
of privacy. But doing so requires action. Congress . . . hello?

389. In re Google, Inc. Gmail Litigation, MDL No. 2430, 2013 WL 1400369, at *1
(J.P.M.L. 2013).
390. Id.
391. In re Google, Inc. Gmail Litigation, No. 12-MD-02430_LHK, 2013 WL 5423918
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013).
392. Id. at *13.
393. Id. at *14.

